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ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS 
  
Health and health care are dominant economic and political issues in the 
United States and many other countries.  This dissertation contains two essays 
addressing different subjects within the field of health economics.  The first essay 
is labor market oriented:  “An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Obesity on 
Wages.” It examines the effects of overweight and obesity on the wages of men 
and women.  The second essay, “An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health 
Care of Certain Medicare Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997” 
examines changes in the treatment of Medicare patients in light of 
reimbursement changes brought about by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
This analysis contained in “An Economic Analysis of Obesity on Wages” 
improves on previous work by using a dataset that can allow health effects to be 
better examined.  Three series of regressions are performed, where log wage 
income is regressed on a series of variables including categorical variables 
based on body mass index.  In contrast to some previous research, this analysis 
finds that the wages of obese individuals are not depressed by excess weight.  It 
is possible that, because of the increasing prevalence of overweight and obesity 
over the last 20 years, any associated stigma has dwindled. 
“An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health Care of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997” examines the effects of one of the provisions of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Specifically, the analysis examines the 
implementation of the Post Acute Care Transfer policy, a change to Medicare 
Part A, caused the length of stay for patients grouped in certain targeted 
diagnosis related groups (DRGs) to increase, keeping with the goal of the policy 
change.  In analyzing the short-stay patients, the data show that patients who 
were grouped into the pilot DRGs and were transferred after 10/01/98 (the 
effective date of the policy) were not in the hospital longer than before 10/01/98, 
implying that hospitals might not have been exploiting a financial loophole, as 
thought by the Health Care Financing Administration, now the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Health and health care are dominant economic and political issues in the 
United States and many other countries.  It is no wonder that health economics 
has emerged as a distinct specialty within economics: According to the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, by 2016, health care spending in the United 
States is projected to reach $4.1 trillion and 19.6 percent of GDP 
(www.cms.hhs.gov).  Increases in spending are anticipated be primarily in the 
areas of hospital care, home health services, drugs and public health programs.  
Health economics is defined as the study of how resources are allocated to and 
within the health economy, including the production of health care and its 
distribution across populations (Folland, Goodman and Stano 2000). 
Does Economics Apply?  
 
A frequent complaint about economics is that it is irrelevant to the study of 
health and health care.  However, if economics is simply the study of how scarce 
resources are used to produce and distribute goods and services, then 
economics certainly applies.  Also, many have argued that the purchase of health 
care is different than the purchase of a car, for example, and, therefore, 
consumers do not respond to financial incentives.  The argument often points to 
the emergency nature of some situations, like heart attacks.  However, much of 
health care does not fit this emergency nature.  Rather, much of health care is 
routine or elective, involving problems such as upper respiratory infections, back 
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pain and checkups.  Furthermore, data from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment (Manning, et al 1987) point to the idea that economic incentives do 
matter. 
Kenneth Arrow (1963) helped establish health economics as a field.  He 
stressed the prevalence of uncertainty in healthcare, both on the demand side 
and the supply side.  Consumers are uncertain of their health status and need for 
health care in any future time period, implying that the demand for health care is 
irregular in nature from the individual’s perspective.  On the supply side, 
consumers often do not know the expected outcomes of various treatments 
without their doctors’ advice.  Often, doctors themselves cannot predict the 
outcomes of treatments with certainty. 
The problem of uncertainty can in part be attributed to a lack of 
information.  Actual and potential information problems in health care markets 
raise many economic questions.  Sometimes information is unavailable to all 
parties concerned.  At other times, the information in question is known to some 
parties but not to all.  The purchase of health goods departs from the model of 
perfect information.  Consumers may not know which physicians or hospitals are 
of good quality.  They may not know whether they are ill or what should be done 
if they are.  This lack of information makes the consumer, the principal, 
dependent on the provider, the agent.  The provider offers both the information 
and the service, leading to the possibility of conflicting interests. 
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The Analyses Performed in this Dissertation 
  
Health economics touches on a variety of fields within economics.  
Investigating hospital behavior can involve borrowing from the field of industrial 
organization.  Examinations of health insurance could involve techniques 
developed in labor economics.  Discussions of government health care programs 
such as Medicare or Medicaid involve public economics.   
This dissertation contains two essays addressing different subjects within 
the field of health economics.  The first essay is labor market oriented:  “An 
Economic Analysis of the Effects of Obesity on Wages.” It examines, as the title 
implies, the effects of overweight and obesity on the wages of men and women.  
The second essay, “An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Health and Health 
Care of Certain Medicare Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997” 
examines changes in the treatment of Medicare patients in light of 
reimbursement changes brought about by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
Both essays address issues interesting to health economists and have 
broad ties to public policy.  For example, while it can be argued that obesity is a 
result of private choices, the increases in the rates of obesity over the last 
decades may be an unintended result of economic progress, as discussed in 
Culter, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003).  If overweight persons consume more health 
care, financial externalities may exist, which can open the door for government 
intervention    
When thinking about the Medicare program, it is important to understand 
that the aging of the population represents a profound demographic shift which 
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will surely shape our budgetary and economic future.  The Census Bureau 
anticipates that, by 2050, the U.S. population aged 65 and over will increase by 
nearly 52 million (www.census.gov).  If medical costs generally increase with 
age, this increase in the aged population will stress the Medicare program, 
raising policy issues of funding, reimbursement and coverage of health care. 
The dissertation is organized the following way: Chapter 2 contains the 
essay, “An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Obesity on Wages,” and Chapter 
3 contains the essay, “An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health Care of 
Certain Medicare Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.”  Both essays 
are briefly introduced below.  Chapter 4, the conclusion, contains some final 
thoughts. 
An Economic Analysis of the Impact of the Effects of Obesity on Wages 
 
It is currently estimated that approximately one-third of all Americans are 
classified as obese   Between 1976–1980 and 2003–2004, the prevalence of 
obesity among adults aged 20–74 years increased from 15.0% to 32.9% 
(www.cdc.gov).    
Overweight and obesity are primarily measured by the body mass index 
(BMI).  BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in 
meters.  Another way to calculate BMI is by the following (www.cdc.gov): 
BMI = (             Weight in Pounds              (Height in inches) x (Height in inches) ) x 703 
 
This measure is cited as being more reliable than weight alone, since it 
adjusts for height.  However, it does fall victim to inaccurate reporting, since 
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people may have a tendency to overestimate height and underestimate weight.  
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “overweight” is 
defined as a BMI of between 25 and 29.9, and “obese” is defined as a BMI of 
greater than 30.  Individuals with normal weight will have a BMI between 18 and 
24.9.  Those who are underweight will have a BMI of less than 18.   
The increasing prevalence of obesity over the last 20 years is a major 
public health concern because of the association with several chronic diseases 
including Type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, cancer and musculoskeletal 
disorders.  Excess weight is associated with many chronic illnesses.  If 
overweight individuals consume more health care, financial externalities exist, 
particularly if the health care is publicly financed.  These financial externalities 
could be large, since it is possible for individuals with these illnesses to live 
relatively long lives.   
While this analysis does not examine health care costs of overweight and 
obesity, it does examine the “cost” of overweight and obesity in terms of effects 
on income.  Past research has shown that overweight and obesity is detrimental 
to wages, particularly for women.  For example, Register and Williams (1990) 
found that obese females earn more than 12% less than comparable non-obese 
females, while finding no significant effect of obesity on the earnings of males.  
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) examined the impact of physical looks on 
earnings.  All other factors constant, the wages of below average looking workers 
were less than wages of above average looking workers.  Averett and Korenman 
(1996) found that obese women have lower family incomes than women whose 
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weight for height is within the recommended range.  Results for men are mixed.  
Gortmaker, et al, (1993) found that both women and men who had been 
overweight were less likely to have married, had completed fewer years of 
education, and had lower household incomes, lower self esteem and higher rates 
of poverty than those who had not been overweight. 
However, past research used relatively old data.  Would a similar analysis 
with newer data yield similar results?    Nearly all of the work that has been done 
thus far on the effects of weight on wages utilized the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (1979), or NLSY.  This analysis in this essay improves on 
previous work by using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (2000), or MEPS, 
which can allow health effects to be examined more completely than datasets 
that were utilized most frequently in the examination of this topic.  The MEPS is 
more recent and, unlike the NLSY, economists interested in health issues, health 
care consumption and employment are only beginning to examine the MEPS.  By 
using this dataset, it is possible to extend the age range of individuals examined 
in the research instead of focusing on youth and, while the dataset is focused on 
medical expenditures, it includes much more health and disability information 
than the NLSY and includes more variables on health insurance and healthcare 
consumption.  The MEPS includes job information, including separate variables 
on occupation and industry and allows for controlling for conditions, such as 
blindness or asthma, which could affect income but are not related to obesity. All 
this additional information makes for a better rounded analysis of weight on 
income by controlling for factors that could also affect income.   
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 This paper employs standard wage equations with Heckman corrections 
for men as well as for women.  In the data used in this analysis, over half of the 
observations are over what is considered a healthy weight.  The results are 
interesting because they contradict some existing research on weight and 
women’s wages.  In contrast to some previous research, this analysis finds that 
the wages of obese individuals are not depressed by excess weight.  It is 
possible that, because of the increasing prevalence of overweight and obesity 
over the last 20 years, any associated stigma has dwindled. 
An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health Care of Certain Medicare 
Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
 
Before the enactment of the Medicare program (Title XVIII of the Social 
Security Act) in 1965, older persons generally had either inadequate or no health 
insurance (www.cms.hhs.gov).  Older individuals trying to buy health insurance 
privately were often denied coverage on the basis of age or pre-existing 
conditions while others simply could not afford the cost of such coverage. 
Without health insurance, the choices for older adults needing health care were 
few. In the decades since Medicare’s enactment, the program has seen changes 
and refinements, most notably from the transition from retrospective payment to 
prospective payment.  Medicare continues to evolve, as the program faces 
insolvency and an aging population. 
The focus of the paper in this dissertation is on the changes to Medicare 
Part A brought about by the Post Acute Care Transfer Policy provision of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997.    One of the biggest motivations of changes to 
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Medicare policy was the pending collapse of Medicare Part A.  By early 1997, 
Medicare Part A was forecasted to become insolvent during 2001 (Guterman 
2000).  
The Balanced Budget Act instructed the Health Care Financing 
Administration (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) to identify 
10 diagnosis related groups (DRGs) to test the feasibility of extending the 
existing prospective payment system (PPS) acute care transfer payment policy to 
post acute, or post-hospital settings, the intent being to decrease the financial 
incentive to prematurely transfer patients from hospitals to acute care settings.  
The data used in this analysis is the 1998-2000 Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP), sponsored by the Agency of Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ).  They contain information on diagnoses, admission and 
discharge status such as whether the patient was admitted through the 
emergency room or on a weekend and whether the patient was discharged into 
post-acute care, to home, or died.  Patient demographics and basic hospital 
characteristics including ownership type, region, teaching status and bed size are 
also available.  While several regressions are run, the main thrust of the analysis 
is the examination of the “short stay” patients.  In analyzing the short-stay 
patients, the data show that patients who were grouped into the pilot DRGs and 
were transferred after 10/01/98 (the effective date of the policy) were not in the 
hospital longer than before 10/01/98, implying that hospitals might not have been 
exploiting a financial loophole, as thought by the Health Care Financing 
Administration, now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
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The two essays are as follows: as outlined above, Chapter 2 is entitled 
“An Economic Analysis of Obesity on Wages.”  Chapter 3 is entitled “An 
Economic Analysis of the Impact of Health Care of Certain Medicare Provisions 
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.”  Chapter 4 presents concluding thoughts. 
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Chapter 2 
 An Economic Analysis of Obesity on Wages 
 
Introduction 
 
In “The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease 
Overweight and Obesity” (2001), former United States Surgeon General Dr. 
David Satcher states the following: 
“Overweight and obesity may not be infectious diseases, but they have 
reached epidemic proportions in the United States.  Overweight and obesity are 
increasing in both genders and among all population groups.  In 1999, an 
estimated 61 percent of U.S. adults were overweight or obese, and 13 percent of 
children and adolescents were overweight.  Today there are nearly twice as 
many overweight children and almost three times as many overweight 
adolescents as there were in 1980.  We already are seeing tragic results from 
these trends.  Approximately 300,000 deaths a year in this country are currently 
associated with overweight and obesity.  Left unabated, overweight and obesity 
may soon cause as much preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking.” 
 
In his speech before the Harvard School of Public Health on July 1, 2003, 
Food and Drug Administration Commissioner Mark McClellan addressed what he 
claimed was one of our “most pressing public health problems”: 
“The consequences of poor diets, including the growing prevalence of excess 
weight, and growing risks of diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, 
arthritis, respiratory difficulties, and many cancers that go along with it, is 
endangering and diminishing the lives of millions of Americans.” 
 
Comments made by the former Surgeon General and the former 
Commissioner shed light on a complex public health concern encompassing 
several issues: poor diet, increases in the prevalence of overweight and obesity, 
and the connection to a variety of chronic illnesses.  The increasing prevalence 
of obesity is a major public health concern because obesity is associated with 
several chronic diseases: diabetes, heart disease, and certain types of cancer.  
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However, why would an economist be interested in obesity and related issues, 
such as diet and its relation to chronic illness, and what is the federal 
government’s interest in obesity?  As pointed out in Anderson, et al. (2003), there 
is a small body of economic literature devoted to obesity and its related issues1. 
The federal government has long been interested in health and nutrition issues, 
introducing the Food Pyramid (now called My Pyramid) and developing an entire 
website devoted to health and nutrition, http://www.nutrition.gov.   
According to the Grossman model of the demand for health capital (1972), 
health is both consumption and an investment good.  It is a consumption good 
because it makes people feel better and it is an investment good because good 
health enhances earning capacity.  The model regards the consumer as a 
producer who buys market inputs (such as food, medical care and clothing) and 
combines them with time to produce services, which increase utility.  The 
services are performed in the labor market for wages which are then used to 
purchase more market inputs.  What social public health professionals and social 
scientists, including economists, are observing is the phenomenon that 
overweight and obesity rates have been increasing, particularly in the last two 
decades.  According to the Grossman model, this is a result of individuals eating 
more or exercising less, or both, but it could be assumed that these are both 
utility-enhancing.  This tradeoff between health and earnings implies that obesity 
has labor market effects.   
                                                 
1 See Lakadawalla and Philipson (2002), Cutler, et al. (2002) and Finkelstein et al. (2003), among 
other papers reviewed in the Review of Relevant Literature. 
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The simplest explanation as to why both economists and governments are 
interested in obesity issues is the possible presence of externalities.  This 
possibility should be of concern, even if we believe obesity and overweight is the 
result of individuals acting in their own self interest.  Excess body weight is 
associated with many chronic illnesses and, if overweight individuals consume 
more health care, financial externalities exist, particularly if the health care is 
publicly financed.  Given advances over time in the care of chronic illnesses such 
as hypertension and diabetes2, these financial externalities could be large, since 
it is possible for individuals with these illnesses to live relatively long lives.  This 
may be different from smokers, who generate financial externalities through 
greater consumption of medical services but, since smokers tend to live shorter 
lives than non-smokers, tend to consume fewer resources in old age (Viscusi 
1995).    
Therefore, the time is right to begin examining the issues involving excess 
weight and obesity and attempting to tie these issues with topics familiar to 
economists, such as employment choices and income.  While an examination of 
financial externalities is beyond the scope of this paper, it will address a couple of 
these issues, specifically employment and income.  This chapter is organized in 
the following way: Section II introduces obesity and overweight as medical 
conditions: how they are defined, obesity trends, and health effects from being 
                                                 
2 For example, before the discovery of insulin in 1921, diabetics often died shortly after diagnosis 
due to a condition known as diabetic ketoacidosis, defined as a state of absolute or relative 
insulin deficiency aggravated by ensuing hyperglycemia or dehydration.  While it is now 
uncommon for this to occur, diabetics are now threatened more by heart attacks, strokes, kidney 
failure and infections.  However, careful monitoring of the disease can reduce the likelihood of 
these events (www.netwellness.org,). 
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overweight.  Section III outlines literature that has already addressed issues 
involving obesity.  Section IV presents an analysis of wages earned by those 
classified as overweight or obese, and Section V concludes. 
Section II 
Obesity/Overweight Trends 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, overweight and obesity have become a 
major healthcare concern over the last few decades.  Overweight and obesity are 
primarily measured by the body mass index (BMI).  BMI is defined as weight in 
kilograms divided by the square of height in meters.  Another way to calculate 
BMI is by the following (United States Centers for Disease Control 2003): 
BMI = (             Weight in Pounds              (Height in inches) x (Height in inches) ) x 703 
 
This measure is cited as being more reliable than weight alone, since it 
adjusts for height.  However, it does fall victim to inaccurate reporting, since 
people may have a tendency to overestimate height and underestimate weight.  
The overweight and obesity are defined by the BMI thresholds below. 
BMI Weight Status
Below 18  Underweight  
18 – 24.9  Normal  
25.0 – 29.9  Overweight  
30.0 and Above  Obese
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2005) 
Overweight and obesity are particularly interesting health issues since, 
over the last few decades, the prevalence of overweight and obesity has 
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increased over genders, all ages, all ethnic/racial groups, all educational groups 
and all smoking statuses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003).  
Currently, it is estimated that approximately 61.3 million adults, or one-third of all 
Americans, are classified as obese. Between 1960 and 2000, it is estimated that 
the prevalence of overweight increased slightly from 31.5 to 33.6 percent among 
U.S. adults aged 20-74.  In contrast, during the same time period, the prevalence 
of obesity more than doubled—from 13.3% to 30.9%, with most of the increase 
occurring in the last two decades (National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive 
and Kidney Diseases of the National Institutes of Health [NIDDK] 2003).   
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention relate a host of chronic 
conditions to excess weight, including: 
• High blood pressure, hypertension, high cholesterol 
• Coronary heart disease, and angina pectoris (chest pain) 
• Type 2 Diabetes 
• Osteoarthritis 
• Poor female reproductive health (such as menstrual irregularities, infertility, -i
 rregular ovulation) 
• Bladder control problems (such as stress incontinence) 
• Congestive heart failure 
• Gallstones 
• Obstructive sleep apnea and respiratory problems 
• Stroke 
• Some types of cancer (such as endometrial, breast, prostate, and colon) 
• Psychological disorders (such as depression, eating disorders, distorted body  
image, and low self esteem). 
• Uric acid nephrolithiasis (kidney stones) 
 
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/)  
 
As can be seen, the conditions associated with excess weight are 
extensive.  While a discussion of all of the above conditions is not practical, brief 
discussions of conditions most associated with excess weight, diabetes and 
hypertension, are shown below, for informational purposes. 
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Diabetes 
Diabetes prevents the body from using food.  The pancreas produces 
insulin, which helps the body convert food to energy.  More specifically, insulin 
“unlocks” the body’s cells, allowing glucose to enter and provide food.  When a 
person has diabetes, the pancreas either does not make insulin or the body 
cannot use insulin properly.  Without insulin, glucose, the body’s main source of 
energy, builds up in the blood (American Diabetes Association 2003).  Diabetes 
can be a devastating disease.  Once a person develops diabetes, his or her 
chance of developing conditions such as heart disease, vision problems and 
nerve damage increase.  In addition, diabetics often require amputations of 
extremities due to poor circulation and nerve damage (American Diabetes 
Association 2003): 
Three major types of diabetes exist (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2003), although one type, gestational diabetes, is associated with 
pregnancy and will not be discussed here: 
Type 1 Diabetes: This type is also known as Juvenile Diabetes because it is 
generally diagnosed in children and young adults. Type 1 diabetes likely 
accounts for 5% to 10% of all cases of diabetes. While risk factors are not as well 
defined for type 1 diabetes compared to type 2 diabetes, it is believed that 
autoimmune, genetic, and environmental actors are involved in the development 
of this type of diabetes. 
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Type 2 Diabetes: About 17 million people in the U.S. have type 2 diabetes which 
accounts for more than 90% of all diabetes cases (NIDDK 2003).  This type is 
most associated with excess weight.  Being overweight or obese can trigger this 
type of diabetes because excess fat prevents insulin from working properly.  
Among those with Type 2 diabetes, 67% have a BMI of at least 27 and 30% have 
a BMI of at least 30 (NIDDK 2003).  Type 2 diabetes is treated with diet and 
exercise, supplemented by diabetes pills or insulin, if necessary.  To the extent 
that Type 2 diabetes is connected with excess weight, this disease is preventable 
by maintaining a healthy weight.  In this paper, Type 2 Diabetes will be the type 
of diabetes of concern. 
o Pre-diabetes: This is a condition that almost always precedes Type 
2 diabetes, where blood glucose levels are high, but not high 
enough for a Type 2 diagnosis. It is estimated that approximately 
20 million have pre-diabetes (NIDDK 2003). 
People who might have diabetes may have some or none of the following 
symptoms (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2003): 
• Frequent urination  
• Excessive thirst  
• Unexplained weight loss  
• Extreme hunger  
• Sudden vision changes  
• Tingling or numbness in hands or feet  
• Feeling very tired much of the time  
• Very dry skin  
• Sores that are slow to heal  
• More infections than usual.  
 16
In addition, nausea, vomiting, or stomach pains may accompany some of 
these symptoms in abrupt onset of type 1 diabetes (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention 2003).  
According to a report by the American Diabetes Association (2003), the 
total economic burden of diabetes was $132 billion in 2002.  Put another way, the 
per capita healthcare costs for those with diabetes was $10,071 in 1997 and 
increased to $13,243 in 2002.  Compare this to per capita costs for those who do 
not have diabetes: $2,560 in 2002.  However, the report admits these estimates 
likely underestimate the true burden of diabetes, since it omits pain and suffering, 
value of care by nonpaid caregivers, and services such as dental and nutritional 
services that diabetics may utilize more often than non-diabetics.  
The approach of the American Diabetes Association is to be contrasted 
with benefit cost analysis.  Benefit cost analysis starts with the acknowledgement 
that the primary beneficiaries of improved control of diabetes are diabetics 
themselves.  For benefit cost analysis the conceptual correct method for valuing 
better control of diabetes is based on the preferences of individuals who have 
diabetes or individuals who may be able to prevent diabetes.  Their willingness to 
pay is likely to be the largest share of social benefits of controlling diabetes 
(Tolley, Kenkel and Fabian 1994).  
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Hypertension 
Blood pressure is the force of the blood in the arteries.  The force of the 
blood when the heart beats is the systolic pressure and the force of the blood 
when the heart is at rest is the diastolic pressure, measured in millimeters of 
mercury.  As shown below, adult hypertension (high blood pressure) is defined 
as systolic pressure equal to or greater than 140 mm Hg, and diastolic pressure 
equal to or greater than 90 mm Hg.  
American Heart Association Recommended Blood Pressure Levels 
Blood Pressure Category Systolic 
(mm Hg) 
 Diastolic 
(mm Hg) 
Normal less than 120 and less than 80 
Prehypertension 120-139 or 80-89 
High    
Stage 1 140-159 or 90-99 
Stage 2 160 or higher or 100 or higher 
    
The American Heart Association estimates that as many as one in four 
Americans have high blood pressure and nearly one-third of those who have 
hypertension do not know it.  Along with high salt and/or alcohol consumption, 
lack of exercise and stress, obesity is listed as a controllable risk factor for 
hypertension3.  Obesity contributes to hypertension by increasing strain on the 
heart. 
To get a feeling for how cardiovascular disease is related to excess 
weight, consider the following: the prevalence of hypertension in overweight U.S. 
adults is 22.1% for men with BMI between 25 and 27 and 27% for men with BMI 
                                                 
3 Uncontrollable risk factors include race, age and family history. 
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between 27 and 30. For women, the rates are slightly higher: 27.7% for women 
with BMI between 25 and 27 and 32.7% for women with BMI between 27 and 30.  
By comparison, the prevalence of hypertension in adults who are not overweight 
(BMI<25) is 14.9% for men and 15.2% for women.   
The prevalence of high blood cholesterol (>=240mg/dL) in overweight U.S. 
adults is 19.1% for men with BMI between 25 and 27; 21.6% for men with BMI 
between 27 and 30; 30.5% for women with BMI between 25 and 27 and 29.6% 
for women with BMI between 27 and 30.  Compare those percentages with 
adults who are not overweight: 13% for men and 13.4% for women (NIDDK 
2003). Given these statistics, there appears to be a definite incentive to control 
one’s weight in order to ward off heart disease. 
Section III 
Review of Relevant Literature 
 
While overweight/obesity and its related chronic health issues have been 
examined in the medical literature (see Mokdad, et al. [2001], among others), it is 
a topic that is just beginning to be examined by economists in any depth.4  
Indeed, Philipson (2001) stressed the importance of an economic research 
agenda which examines determinants of obesity.  
Lakadawalla and Philipson (2002) treated obesity as an economic 
phenomenon and examine the long run growth in weight over time.  They argued 
that technological change induced weight growth by making home and market 
production more sedentary and by lowering food prices through agricultural 
innovation.  They decomposed the growth in weight over the last few decades 
                                                 
4 One exception is Finkelstein, et al. (2003). 
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and found that about 40% could be due to food supply expansion, and about 
60% due to demand factors, like a fall in physical activity in market and in-home 
production.   However, the authors did not examine behaviors associated with 
obesity/overweight or the corresponding link to chronic illness or medical 
expenditure.   
Cutler, et al. (2003), also viewed the increase in obesity as a function of 
technological improvement.  They argued that the increases in obesity rates 
since 1975 are a result of increased food consumption, as opposed to decreased 
exercise and also looks to improvements in technology for the increase.  The 
authors stated that these improvements have led to significant decreases in time 
costs of food preparation.  With time delay being an important mechanism for 
discouraging food consumption, decreases in these time costs led to increased 
weights.   
Finkelstein, et al. (2003) attempted to estimate aggregate overweight- and 
obesity-attributable medical spending in the U.S.  They estimated spending to be 
$92.6 million (in 2002 dollars) and their results suggested that per capita 
increase in obesity-attributable spending was greatest for Medicare patients.  
While the authors were able to estimate weight-related spending, no attempt was 
made to connect economic behavior to excess weight.  
Mokdad, et al. (1999) aimed to estimate the prevalence of obesity, 
diabetes and use of weight control strategies among US adults in 2000.  They did 
this using the 2000 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, with the main 
outcome measures being BMI, based on self-reported height and weight, self 
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reported diabetes, prevalence of weight loss or maintenance attempts and weight 
control strategies used.  They estimated that the prevalence of obesity was 
19.8%, the prevalence of diabetes 7.3% and the prevalence of both combined 
was 2.9%.  They concluded that the prevalence of obesity and diabetes 
continues to increase among US adults. 
Calle et al. (2003) examined the influence of excess body weight on the 
risk of death due to cancer. Using data from the Cancer Prevention Study II, a 
dataset begun by the American Cancer Society in 1982, the authors examine 
BMI in 1982 and the risk of death from all cancers and from cancers at individual 
sites.  They find that the heaviest members of this cohort had death rates from all 
cancers combined that were 52% higher (for men) and 62% higher (for women) 
than men and women of normal weight. 
Kenkel (1991) examined the connection between schooling and health.  
Using the 1985 HPDP Supplement to the Health Interview Survey, the author 
concluded that the relationship between schooling and the consumption of 
cigarettes, alcohol and exercise is explained by differences in health knowledge.  
However, most of schooling’s effects on health behavior remained after 
differences in knowledge are controlled for. 
Himes (2000) used data from the Longitudinal Study of Aging and the 
Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old Survey to examine the effects of 
obesity late in life. The author found increases in the prevalence of obesity over 
time among those aged 70+.  Obesity was most strongly related to limitations in 
activities of daily living (ADLs) for women and to activities related to mobility.  In 
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addition, the author found obesity was associated with an increased prevalence 
of arthritis, diabetes, and hypertension. 
In Allison, et al. (1999), the authors attempted to estimate the number of 
annual deaths attributable to obesity among US adults.  The authors used data 
from 5 prospective cohort studies: the Alameda Community Health Study, the 
Framingham Heart Study, the Tecumseh Community Health Study, the American 
Cancer Society Cancer Prevention Study I and the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey I Epidemiologic Follow-Up Study.  In addition, they used one 
published study, the Nurses’ Health Study, in conjunction with 1991 national 
statistics on body mass index distributions, population size, and overall deaths.  
They calculated relative hazard ratios of death for obese or overweight persons 
and concluded that the estimated number of annual deaths attributable to obesity 
among US adults was approximately 280,000 based on hazard ratios from all 
subjects and 325,000 based on hazard ratios from only nonsmokers and never-
smokers. 
Stevens, et al. (1998), attempted to analyze mortality as a function of 
body-mass index across age groups. The authors studied 12 years’ worth of data 
from the American Cancer Society’s Cancer Prevention Study.  They used 
proportional hazards analysis to assess associations between body-mass index 
and mortality from cardiovascular disease.  Body-mass index was examined as 
both a continuous and a categorical variable.  Likelihood ratio tests were used to 
test for interactions in the proportional hazards models.  The authors find that 
greater body mass index was associated with higher mortality from all causes 
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and from cardiovascular disease in men and women up to 75 years old.  
However, the relative risk associated with greater body-mass index declined with 
age.  They concluded that excess body weight increases the risk from any cause 
and from cardiovascular disease in adults between 30 and 74 years of age.  The 
elative risk associated with greater body weight was higher among younger 
subjects. 
Other researchers approached obesity/overweight from a labor market 
standpoint.  In particular, obesity is viewed as an issue of discrimination based 
on looks.  Register and Williams (1990) aimed to determine whether there exists 
a wage penalty for obese individuals, who they defined by using a standard table 
of weight for height, as developed by The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
of New York.  They asserted that the obese, due to being frequently ridiculed, 
suffer a social penalty similar to that of blacks, females and the disabled which 
carried over into the labor market.  The authors used the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth to estimate earnings functions for full time workers aged 18-25 
in the 1982 survey year.  The earnings functions used log wage as the 
dependent variable, controlled for basic individual-specific characteristics and 
included a Heckman correction to control for selectivity bias.  They found that 
obese females earn more than 12% less than comparable non-obese females, 
but no significant effect of obesity was found for the earnings of males.  The 
authors suggested that further examining why weight matters only for females 
would be a worthy avenue for further research.  
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Loh (1993) followed up Register and Williams with an analysis of wage 
levels of full-time workers in the 1982 NLSY of wage changes between 1982 and 
1985.  He found no effect of obesity on male or female wage levels in 1982 
although wages grew about 5% less between 1982 and 1985.  The empirical 
findings showed that height positively affects wage levels among both male and 
female full time workers but does not affect their wage growth.  Therefore, Loh 
stated, obesity does not lower workers’ wages, but slows wage growth, 
particularly for men.  The author admitted that better data need to be examined 
before any conclusion can be reached about the cause of the wage effects of 
height and weight.  Additionally, the author suggested work on other age groups 
of workers since it is possible that the greater years of experience and training of 
more mature workers will offset the wage effects of height and weight. 
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) examined the impact of physical looks on 
earnings.  Looks are measured using interviewers’ ratings of respondents’ 
physical appearance.  The purpose was to perform the first study of labor market 
favoritism for the more attractive.  To do this, the authors utilized three different 
datasets that provide information on attractiveness. 
 1977 Quality of Employment Survey 
 1971 Quality of American Life Survey 
 1981 Canadian Quality of Life Survey 
They aimed to isolate the effect of beauty on earnings by controlling for as many 
other causes of variation as possible, using standard earnings equations.  They 
did incorporate obese and overweight variables into the analysis, but these were 
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determined by interviewer observation, not by self reported weight and height.  
They found some evidence of sorting of good looking people into professions 
where looks are productive and some evidence of a positive impact of workers’ 
looks on earnings.  All other variables constant, the wages of below average 
looking workers were less than wages of above average looking workers.  They 
found that obese women earned about 12% less than their counterparts of 
“average” weight, although this difference was not statistically significant. 
Averett and Korenman (1996) examined income, marital status and hourly 
pay differentials by body mass index corresponding to Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company weight-for-height tables.  They hypothesized that attempts 
to change the stigma attached to obesity and eating disorders is difficult if 
economic differences reinforce social and psychological pressures. 
The authors used the 1988 NLSY, which provides data on men and 
women aged 23-31.  They classified respondents into three categories: 
underweight, overweight, and obese and compare the average of BMI in 1981 
and 1982 to the average BMI in 1988 and 1989.  In other words, they compared 
BMI at ages 16 to 24 to BMI at ages 23 to 31.  Like other papers, these authors 
found that obese women have lower family incomes than women whose weight 
for height is within the recommended range.  Results for men were mixed.   
Gortmaker, et al, (1993) also used the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth, and relied on a lagged body mass variable which addressed the idea that 
body mass of years ago is more exogenous to current economic status than is 
current body mass. This study examined data from 1981 and follow-up data in 
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1988 accounting for 65-79% of original cohort.  In 1988, they found generally 
lower levels of socioeconomic attainment among the subjects who were 
overweight in 1981.  “Crude” estimates of the difference were greater for women.  
Both women and men who had been overweight were less likely to have married, 
had completed fewer years of education, and had lower household incomes, 
lower self esteem and higher rates of poverty than those who had not been 
overweight. 
Baum and Ford (2004) used the NLSY to examine the effects of obesity 
on wage and focus particularly on gender.  They presented sample means 
indicating that both obese men and women experience a persistent wage penalty 
over the first two decades of their careers.  However, after further controlling for 
socioeconomic and familial factors, the results did not explain why obese workers 
experience persistent wage penalties.  The authors concluded that other 
variables—including job discrimination, health-related factors and/or behavior 
patterns of obese workers—may be the channels through which obesity 
adversely affects wages. 
Also using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Cawley (2003) 
tested four possible explanations for strong race and gender differences in the 
correlation between obesity and wages: 1. Voluntary sorting of the obese into 
jobs with better health benefits at the expense of lower wages, differing by 
gender and race; 2. Weight affects physical health and disability in a manner that 
varies by gender and race; 3. Weight affects self esteem or depression in a 
manner that varies by gender and race; 4. There is weight-based discrimination 
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that differs by gender and race.  Cawley found evidence to support the physical 
health and disability hypothesis, but little evidence to support the other three.  
However, he warned that the disability hypothesis should be interpreted with 
caution because the paper was unable to prove that weight causes disability. 
Rosmond and Bjorntorp (1999) attempted to examine any connection 
between abdominal obesity and psychosocial and socio-economic handicaps for 
women, since connections between these variables have been found in men.  
They found that BMI was associated with alcohol abstinence and negatively to 
wine drinking.  Waist to hip ratio was correlated directly with cigarette smoking 
and negatively with consumption of wine and beer.  Both BMI and waist to hip 
ratio showed independent associations with low education, unemployment and 
problems at work when employed, as well as with little physical activity and much 
TV-watching.  In addition, the waist to hip ratio showed a negative, independent 
relationship to housing conditions.  The authors stated that these observations 
suggest psychosocial and socio-economic handicaps as well as low physical 
activity in abdominally obese women. 
Mitra (2001) analyzed the effects of physical attributes (height and weight) 
on wages of males and females in “professional” and “blue-collar” occupations.  
An additional theme of analysis was whether physical attributes have any impact 
on the wages of workers with high mathematics and computational skills.  
Results presented in this paper showed that, among professionals and blue-
collar workers, physical attributes significantly affected the wages of women and 
had no impact on the wages of men.  Overweight women experienced significant 
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wage penalties.  Also, among women with above average quantitative skills, the 
effects of physical attributes on wages were insignificant. 
Averett and Korenman (1999) showed that socioeconomic effects of 
obesity appeared larger for whites than blacks.  Obesity was associated with low 
self-esteem among whites, but not blacks.  The authors concluded that cultural 
differences may protect black women from the self esteem loss associated with 
obesity for whites.  Differences in self-esteem did not account for the effects of 
obesity on socioeconomic status.   
Pagan and Davila (1997) also examined the NLSY and utilized a 
multinomial logit specification in order to investigate the occupational selection of 
obese individuals.  They found that women pay a penalty for being obese, but 
overweight males sort themselves into jobs that offset any penalty.  They 
proposed that the occupational sorting among obese women may be mostly 
rooted in labor market discrimination. 
Renna and Thakur (2006) examined the impact of obesity on labor market 
decisions of older adults.  Using the Health and Retirement survey and a fixed 
effects model, they established that obesity significantly increased the probability 
of a worker claiming to be disabled or being retired prior to age 65.  In 
concluding, the authors pointed out the policy implications for such as result and 
suggest that insurance providers could include obesity treatments in health plans 
as a way of keeping older adults in the labor market.  However, they provided no 
cost-effectiveness calculations for such a program. 
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As outlined in this literature review, researchers attacked the topic of 
obesity as an economic phenomenon—examining the growth of obesity as a 
function of technological change and agricultural innovation.  Others looked at 
the effects of obesity on mortality and morbidity, associating obesity with higher 
mortality and risk of diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.  Here, 
however, the primary interest is the effects of overweight and obesity on the labor 
market.  In short, past research has shown that overweight and obesity has 
negative effects on the labor market, especially for women.  While past research 
did not find much of a negative effect on the wages of men, it did show that 
obesity hurts women’s wages by about 12%.  In short, previous research 
associates overweight and obesity with outcomes that are “bad”—bad for 
mortality, bad for disease risks, and bad for labor market outcomes.  As will be 
discussed in the next section, the analysis in this chapter improves on previous 
research in several ways, including using newer data and including better health 
variables to better control for conditions that could affect wages, but are not 
related to weight. 
Section IV 
 
This analysis is an extension of the previous literature that examined the 
effects of weight on income.  However, this analysis improves on previous work 
by using a dataset that can allow health effects to be examined more completely.  
To the best of my knowledge, no other research on the effects of 
overweight/obesity on wages has included additional health variables that can 
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affect wages, but are not related to weight.  This will assist in more fully isolating 
the effects of weight on wages.   
In addition, the dataset used in this analysis has more detailed 
occupational variables.  Instead of using a generic “blue collar” or “white collar” 
variable, like in Cawley (2003), the dataset allows the use of several different 
occupational variables as well as separate industry variables.  As a result, 
interaction between body mass index and occupational and industry variables 
can occur to examine what effects exist across these variables.  It is not apparent 
that any other research has examined the weight/wage relationship this way. 
Dataset 
 
The data used in this analysis is from the 2000 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey (MEPS), administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ), an agency within the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services.  A set of self-reported data, it is a nationally representative 
sample of the civilian non-institutionalized population for the calendar year 2000.  
It provides information on employment, health status, doctors’ visits, hospital 
stays and insurance. MEPS currently has two major components: the Household 
Component and the Insurance Component. The Household Component provides 
data from individual households and their members, which is supplemented by 
data from their medical providers. The Insurance Component is a separate 
survey of employers that provides data on employer-based health insurance. 
(www.meps.ahrq.gov). The Household Component (HC) collects data from a 
sample of families and individuals in selected communities across the United 
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States, drawn from a nationally representative sub sample of households that 
participated in the prior year's National Health Interview Survey (conducted by 
the National Center for Health Statistics) (www.meps.ahrq.gov).  
During the household interviews, MEPS collects information for each 
person in the household on the following: demographic characteristics, health 
conditions, health status, use of medical services, charges and source of 
payments, access to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, 
income, and employment (www.meps.ahrq.gov).    
Nearly all of the work that has been done thus far on the effects of weight 
on wages utilized the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979).  The NLSY is 
an excellent dataset for examining labor market issues and allows for following 
subjects over time.  However, using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey would 
add to the existing literature in several ways: 
• The dataset is more recent; the data was first collected in 1996 and yearly 
thereafter.  In addition, unlike the NLSY, this dataset is only beginning to be 
examined by economists interested in health issues, health care consumption 
and employment. 
• Using this dataset extends the age range of individuals examined in the 
research.  This dataset allows for examination of income for individuals aged 18-
65 in 2000, as opposed to focusing only on youth. 
• While the dataset is focused on medical expenditures, it includes much 
more health and disability information than the NLSY and includes more 
variables on health insurance and healthcare consumption.  In addition, the 
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dataset includes job information, including separate variables on occupation and 
industry.  There are variables on sick time taken from work, doctor’s visits and 
health care coverage.  As mentioned earlier, the dataset also allows for 
controlling for conditions, such as blindness or asthma, which could affect 
income but are not related to obesity. 
This additional information makes for a better rounded analysis of weight 
on income by controlling for factors that could also affect income.   
The MEPS is good for using panel techniques for analyzing medical 
expenditures and particularly good for analyzing insurance coverage, as it is a 
two year panel.  However, height and weight, which is used to calculate BMI in 
this chapter’s analysis, is only recorded one time, as are the other variables of 
interest in my regressions.  Confidentiality concerns limit geographic and 
employment information in the dataset.  Geographic data is limited to census 
region and the variables on occupation and industry variables, while included in 
the MEPS, are not publicly available.  Permission to gain access to these data 
must be granted by AHRQ where the requested variables are merged with the 
public data set and the researcher must perform analyses in cooperation with 
AHRQ’s Data Center in Rockville, Maryland.    
Summary Statistics 
 
This analysis examined 11,614 observations.  This final number was 
arrived at by including only those individuals who were aged 18-65 (the MEPS 
data include information on children and those over age 65), regardless of 
employment status or hours worked.  After eliminating observations with missing 
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data and eliminating observations with extreme height/weight combinations, 
which could reflect reporting errors, the original dataset size of around 25,000 
was reduced to 11,6145.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1. 
 Some things to notice by the summary statistics: 
• 52% of the observations are women 
• 61% of the observations are white 
• 60% of the observations were married 
• The average number of years of education is just over 12 
• About 38% of the individuals lived in the south, but also note that the 
south is a fairly large census region6 and, according to the U.S. Census, about 
36% of the U.S. population lives in this census region (U.S Census Bureau 
2006). 
The most interesting variables are the weight variables.  Body Mass Index 
(BMI), a ratio of weight in kilograms to height in meters squared is calculated to 
create dummy variables: underweight, normal weight, overweight and obese.  
The mean value of BMI is 27, which is considered overweight by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.  Notice the dummy variable overweight: 35% of 
the observations in this dataset are overweight, or have a BMI from 25 to 29.9.  
Sixteen percent of the observations represent obese persons, or those who have 
                                                 
5 In addition to eliminating observations outside the 18-65 age range, an additional 122 
observations were eliminated with years of education less than one year and 249 observations 
were dropped with family size less than one.  Lastly, observations were dropped where BMI was 
less than 15 or greater than 50. 
6 Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, VT, RI, NJ, NY, PA 
Midwest: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD 
South: DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX 
West:  AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY, AK, CA, HI, OR, WA 
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a BMI of 30 or higher.  Figure 1 graphically presents the BMI distribution for men 
and women, Figure 2 presents the distribution for men only, and Figure 3 
presents the distribution for women.  Notice the upper cut off for BMI is 50.  This 
is by design: observations with BMI greater than 50 were eliminated in an effort 
to exclude observations with height or weight recorded in error.  A person who is 
six feet tall would have a BMI of 25 if they weighed 184 pounds.  That person 
would have a BMI of 50 if they weighed 368 pounds.  In total, 51% of the 
observations in this dataset are over what is recognized as a healthy weight.  
This is particularly interesting, since 55% of the observations claim to take part in 
exercise three times a week.  
In addition, dummy variables were generated based on the BMI variable. 
An observation is considered underweight if BMI is less than 18.  Normal weight 
will be indicated by BMI of between 18 and 24.9, and an observation is 
considered overweight if BMI is between 25 and 29.9.  Lastly, an observation is 
considered obese if BMI is over 30.   
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for observations in each BMI 
category.  A couple of interesting observations about this information: 
• The obese category has, on average, the dataset’s oldest observations, 
with a mean age of 42.  The underweight category has, on average, the dataset’s 
youngest observations, with a mean age of 33. 
• Women make up the majority of the underweight and normal weight 
categories, with 75% and 61% of the observations, respectively, while men make 
up most of the overweight category.  The obese category is split equally. 
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Other Notes about Selected Variables 
Earnings: Earnings are measured as wage income for 2000.  This 
measure only includes wages from employment and is therefore a better 
measure of income than total income, since it only includes employment wages 
and not earnings from sources like unemployment benefits or rental property.   
Industry and Occupation Codes:  According to the documentation for the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, these codes were assigned by professional 
coders based on subject responses to questions about employment.  Coding was 
done based on the 1990 Census classification system.  These codes are 
determined at a detailed three digit system and then collapsed into larger groups 
in order to ensure confidentiality. 
Other Health Variables:  In addition to Body Mass Index and the BMI 
categorical variables, the regressions will also include variables on whether or 
not the subject takes part in vigorous physical activity at least three times a week 
and if the subject is a smoker.  Additionally, there are variables on cognitive 
limitations, vision impairment, hearing impairment, stroke, asthma, emphysema, 
and whether or not the respondent was in better health than they were the year 
prior to the interview.   
Cognitive Limitation: Mitra (2001) and Cawley (2004) both discuss the 
importance of controlling for some measure of intelligence or cognitive ability in 
any examination of wages.  In the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the 
cognitive limitation variable is based on a three part question indicating if the 
subject: experiences confusion or memory loss, has problems making decisions, 
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or requires supervision for their own safety.  If a “yes” response is given to any of 
these questions, the person is identified as having a cognitive limitation. For the 
purposes of this analysis, the cognitive limitation variable equals 1 if the 
observation has been identified as having a cognitive limitation and 0 otherwise.   
Vision Problems: The MEPS screeners asked respondents a series of 
questions addressing visual problems.  The vision impairment variables 
summarizes these questions and identifies if the subjects: have no difficulty 
seeing; have some difficulty seeing, can read newsprint, and can recognize 
familiar people; have some difficulty seeing, cannot read newsprint, cannot 
recognize familiar people, but are not blind; or is blind.  It was not practical to 
create dummy variables for individual vision problem categories since each 
category had relatively low numbers of observations. 
Therefore, this variable identifies vision problems beyond those that are 
merely corrected with contacts or glasses.  In this paper, the vision impairment 
variable is equal to 0 if the respondent has been identified as not having any 
difficulty seeing and 1 if the respondent has been identified as having vision 
problems matching the other four categories described above. 
Hearing Problems: The respondents were asked a series of questions 
regarding hearing impairment.  The hearing impairment variable summarizes 
responses and identifies whether or not the subject: has no difficulty hearing; has 
some difficulty hearing, can hear most things people say; has some difficulty 
hearing, cannot hear most things people say, can hear some things people say; 
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has some difficulty hearing, cannot hear most things people say, cannot hear 
some things people say, but is not deaf; or is deaf.   
As with the vision problem variable, the hearing impairment variable is 
equal to 0 if the respondent has no difficulty hearing.  It is equal to 1 if the 
respondent fits into any of the other four categories. Other variables are included 
that indicate whether the respondent had ever been diagnosed with stroke, 
asthma, or emphysema. 
The data in this paper have been merged with data from the Area 
Resource File (ARF).  According to Quality Resource Systems, Inc., the 
organization that maintains the Area Resource File is compiled from several 
resources, including the National Center for Health Statistics, the American 
Hospital Association, and the American Medical Association.  The analyses in 
this paper include variables from this dataset on county-level unemployment 
rates for the year 2000 as well as data on median rent, so as to have a proxy for 
cost of living or area amenities. 
Initial Regression Results 
 
The theoretical framework in this analysis is based on the standard wage 
equation, which can be traced to Jacob Mincer (1974):  
(1) Lnwageincomei=β0 + β1Xi + εi 
In equation 1, X is a vector of characteristic control variables, including 
variables on race, education, marital status, dummy variables based on BMI and 
variables that control for other health issues, including cognitive issues, sight, 
and hearing, that may affect income but that are not related to weight.  Given that 
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past research has pointed to different effects of BMI on wages between men and 
women, the regression is first run with men and women pooled together, and 
then regressions are run on each gender separately.  Results of these 
regressions are presented in Table 2.37.  All regressions in this analysis are run 
omitting the “professional” occupational variable and “professional services” 
industry variable.   
Keep in mind that wage income is not positive for all observations, since 
not all individuals in the survey are employed.  To address the underlying 
decision to work, this analysis uses the Heckman (1979) correction method for 
self-selection.  In the two step method, the first step is a probit equation that 
predicts the probability that an observation has positive wage, that is, whether 
the individual made the decision to work8.  Using the estimates produced from 
the probit equation, a Mills’ ratio is calculated for each observation.  The Mills’ 
ratio is then used as a regressor in the wage equations to produce consistent 
estimates.   
Adjustments to the regression coefficients will be needed.  When the 
dependent variable is in log form and the independent variables are linear, the 
usual interpretation of the coefficient is that, multiplied by 100, it is equal to the 
percentage effect of that variable on the dependent variable.  However, as 
                                                 
7 Regressions were also run that included dummy variables based on age range (age 18-24, age 
25-35, age 36-45, age 46-55 and age 56-65) in lieu of a continuous age variable. The results 
were very similar to the regression results included in this chapter and are, therefore, not included 
here.  In a similar vein, an additional analysis was performed comparable to that in Register and 
Williams (1990), focusing on workers aged 18-25.  In that analysis, obese (BMI 30+) men and 
women suffer similar wage penalties of 6%.  Again, this is similar to the analysis in this chapter 
and these results are not included.    
8 The selection equation contains the following variables: age, age squared, female, years of 
education, race variables, married, regional variables, BMI categorical variables, other health 
variables, family size, county median rent and county unemployment rate. 
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Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) showed, this is an incorrect interpretation for 
dummy variables, since they are not continuous.  A correction must be performed 
on the dummy variables in order to make accurate interpretations of the 
variables’ effects on length of stay.  The correction takes on the form: 
(2) C=ln(1+G) 
In equation 2, C is the coefficient of the dummy variable and G is the 
actual relative effect on earnings of each of the dummy variables.  As mentioned, 
instead of including body mass index, the regressions include categorical 
variables based on body mass index9.  Categorical variables can isolate what 
happens to income when a person is in a range of body mass index and, if one is 
thinking about discrimination, it is easier to look at an individual and discern 
whether they are obese or within a normal weight, rather than determine what the 
numerical body mass index is.  Recall that an individual is considered 
underweight if BMI is less than 18, of normal weight if BMI is between 18 and 24, 
overweight if between 24 and 30 and obese if BMI is greater than 30.  Again, 
regressions are run with normal weight as the omitted variable and reported in 
Table 2.3.   
These results are interesting because they appear, in one sense, to 
contradict previous research.  In the regression run only on women, it appears 
that, relative to women who are within a normal weight range, overweight (BMI 
25-30) women experience only a very slight wage penalty (1.8%) and it is not 
significant by conventional measures.  Underweight (BMI less than 18) and 
                                                 
9 Initially, regressions were performed that included BMI as a continuous variable.  However, 
results of these regressions are not included here because they were not informative. 
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obese (BMI 30+) women do not experience significant wage penalties relative to 
normal-weight women, with penalties of 3.5% and 3.8%, respectively, after 
adjustment.  Relative to normal-weight (BMI 18-24) men, obese (BMI 30+) men 
experience a wage penalty of 3% but, like the coefficients in the regression on 
women, this is not significant by conventional measures.    This is in contrast to 
Averett and Korenman (1999) and Cawley (2004) that show that overweight (BMI 
25-29) women experience wage penalties relative to normal weight (BMI 18-24) 
women.   
In addition, there is the possibility that there is unusual self selection into 
the labor market by individuals according to weight.  Therefore, the first stage 
probit results for each regression could be of interest. The coefficients from the 
weight dummy variables included in the first stage probit are also reported in 
Table 2.3.  In the regression with men and women pooled, and in the regression 
on women only, only the overweight variable in the first stage probit was 
significant at conventional levels.  Overweight women (BMI 25-29) were more 
likely to be in the labor market.  Weight did not affect the likelihood of men being 
in the labor market.   
It is possible that the results are due to the inclusion of better health 
measures in addition to the weight variables10.  For comparison purposes, these 
regressions are performed omitting all health variables aside from the BMI 
categorical variables.  The results are presented in Table 2.4 and indicate that, 
overall, being merely overweight (BMI 24-29) has no significant effect on wages.  
                                                 
10 One note about the coefficients on the health variables.  The coefficient on emphysema is not 
significant in any regression run in this chapter, However, because smoking is also included in 
the regressions, the lack of significance could be due to some degree of multicollinearity. 
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Being underweight (BMI less than 18) or obese (BMI 30+) has a depressive, but 
not significant effect on wages.  Furthermore, being underweight (BMI less than 
18) had a worse effect on wages.  This is true for the separate regressions run 
on men and women also.   
Other Regressions11
 
Overweight Categorical Variable Interacted with Occupational and Industry 
Variables 
An interesting approach to this topic is examining the effect of weight 
across industries and occupations.  If it is the case that discrimination occurs in 
certain occupations or industries, it is more likely to be uncovered using this 
approach, for the simple reason that employers and individuals cannot estimate a 
person’s exact body mass index simply by looking at them, but could easily 
discern whether a person is obese (BMI 30+), or simply overweight (BMI 25-29). 
(3) Lnwageincomei=β0 + β1Xi + β2Overweight*Industryi + 
β3Overweight*Occupationi + β4Occupationi +β5Industryi +εi
As shown in equation 3, the overweight (BMI 24-29) variable is interacted 
with each industry and occupational variable.  With the other regressions, men 
and women are evaluated together, and then separate regressions are run for 
each gender.  Results are shown in Table 2.5. 
                                                 
11 Other regressions performed but not included in this analysis involved focusing on smokers 
and generating a “superobese” variable, that is, one that indicated if a person’s BMI was at least 
35.  These regressions were not included in this analysis because they did not yield interesting 
results  
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As with the original regressions, it is good to note the first stage probit 
results.  In these regressions, the overweight (BMI 24-29) variable was positive 
and significant in the regression with men and women pooled, and in the 
regression with women only.  Overweight women (BMI 24-29) were more likely to 
be in the labor market.   
In the regression run on men and women pooled together, it is interesting 
to note that only two interaction variables were significant.  Those individuals that 
were overweight (BMI 24-29) in the transportation operative occupations earned 
about 14% less relative to the professional occupation and clerical workers 
earned nearly 9% less relative to the professional occupation.  For the other 
occupations and industries, being overweight (BMI 24-29) did not, on average, 
help or hurt wages significantly.  This is particularly interesting for an industry like 
sales, where one might think weight may make a difference. 
In the regression run on men, three categories are significant, and all are 
negative: the managerial, operative and transportation operative occupational 
variables.  No industry variables were significant by conventional measures.  
None of the interacted variables were significant in the regression run on women 
only.  This is an interesting result, because it tells us that, on average, being 
overweight, that is, having a BMI between 25-29, does not significantly hurt 
women, regardless of industry or occupation. 
Obese Categorical Variable Interacted with Occupational and Industry Variables 
Next, the obese variable is interacted with each industry and occupational 
variable as shown in equation 4: 
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(4) Lnwageincomei=β0 + β1Xi + β2Obese*Industryi + β3Obese*Occupationi + 
β4Occupationi +β5Industryi +εi
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.6.  As with the previous 
regressions, the professional occupational variable and the professional services 
industry variable are omitted. In the first stage probit, the underweight (BMI less 
than 18) and overweight (BMI 24-29) variables were significant in the regression 
with men and women pooled.  Overweight has a positive coefficient, underweight 
had a negative coefficient.  In the regression on men only, the underweight 
variable was negative and significant.  In the regression on women only, the 
underweight and overweight variables were significant.  Underweight women 
were less likely to be in the labor market and overweight women were more likely 
to be in the labor market.    
In the regression on men and women, three industry and occupational 
interaction variables were significant.  Obese (BMI 30+) individuals working in 
this occupation earn 10% more relative to the professional category.  The sales 
variable and entertainment variables were the other significant categories, and it 
is not that surprising that these coefficients are negative, given the orientation to 
“looks” these industries have.  Those who are obese (BMI 30+) and working in 
the entertainment industry have wages that are about 38% less, after adjustment, 
relative to the professional category and obese (BMI 30+) individuals working in 
sales earn about 10.5% less, after adjustment, relative to the professional 
category. 
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For men, obese (BMI 30+) individuals in the service industry earned 26% 
more, after adjustment, relative to the professional services industry.  Again, it is 
the entertainment category that yields the largest result.  Obese (BMI 30+) men 
in this industry earned a 44% less, after adjustment, relative to professional 
services.  For women, sales and entertainment were significant: -.148 and -.33, 
respectively, after adjustment.   
The Endogeneity Issue  
While the Heckman correction approach is certainly valid and has been 
used in the past to connect weight, or “looks” to income, it ignores an important 
aspect of the relationship:  that, while excess weight could have a depressive 
effect on income, it is certainly possible that the reverse is also true, that 
socioeconomic status can affect weight.    
The effect of socioeconomic status on weight is a topic generally 
investigated by nutritionists and those in the public health field.  Gibson (2003) 
and Reicks, Randall and Haynes (1994), and Darmon, Ferguson, and Briend 
(2003), just to name a few, examine the effects of low income on obesity and 
food consumption.  Gibson connects low income to obesity and Reicks, et al and 
Darmon, et al connect low income to low consumption of healthful foods, like 
fruits and vegetables.  Unfortunately, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey does 
not contain variables that could clearly be utilized as instruments.   Therefore, 
instrumental variables estimation is not performed here.   
Several past economic papers have addressed the issue of endogeneity 
with respect to body mass and wages.  Conley and Glauber (2005) address 
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endogeneity bias by using an older sample from the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics.  They do sibling-random and fixed effects models and find that a 1% 
increase in a woman’s body mass results in a .6% point decrease in family 
income and .4 percentage point decrease in occupational prestige measured 13-
15 years later.  BMI is also associated with a decrease in women’s likelihood of 
marriage, spouse’s occupational prestige and spouse’s earnings.  Men 
experience no negative effects of body mass on economic outcomes.  Age splits 
show that it is among younger adults where BMI effects are most robust, lending 
support to the interpretation that it is BMI causing occupational outcomes and not 
the reverse. 
Cawley (2004) again uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to 
further explore differences across gender, race, and ethnicity in the relationship 
between weight and wages.  In this paper, he addresses the issue of 
endogeneity using three strategies: using a lagged value of weight, estimating a 
wage equation after taking differences with another individual (either a same sex 
sibling or a twin); lastly, he uses variables to serve as instruments in instrumental 
variables estimation.  He finds that, for black men, weight is actually positively 
correlated with education and intelligence test scores, a result that is opposite for 
other groups.  He attributes unobserved heterogeneity to the results for heavier 
black women, Hispanic men and women, all of whom earn less than lighter 
weight members of each group.  In contrast, weight appears to lower the wages 
of white women.   
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Section V 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper attempted to examine the effects of weight, particularly 
overweight (BMI 24-29) and obesity (BMI 30+), on wages.  Unlike past research 
on this topic, the analyses in this paper use data from the 2000 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey, a dataset that has not been exploited by health 
economists.  As mentioned in the beginning, this dataset allows for this inclusion 
of other health variables that do not relate to weight, but could nevertheless 
affect earnings, such as hearing and vision impairment.  In addition, this dataset 
also allows for the inclusion of occupation and industry variables, something not 
done in other research. 
The results of the wage equations were interesting because they 
contradict some existing research on weight and wages, women’s wages in 
particular.  Cawley and Register and Williams find that, overall, women are hurt 
by being overweight, or having a BMI of 25-29.  In contrast, this analysis finds 
that, in general, the wages of women are not depressed directly by excess 
weight, even women considered obese, or having a BMI of 30 or more.   
The more interesting results came when the overweight and obese 
variables were interacted with each of the occupation and industry variables. It is 
only here that excess weight has a negative effect on women’s income, but only 
for obese women and only in the sales and entertainment industries.   
Rather than answering a question, perhaps this research serves to 
present more questions on the issue of overweight and obesity and wages.  First, 
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past research has presented the idea that overweight and obese individuals may 
experience wage penalties relative to normal weight counterparts.  Pagan and 
Davila (1997), Register and Williams (1990) and Gortmaker, et al. (1993) all 
allude to the idea that discrimination may play a part in these wage penalties.   
While it is difficult to prove, and certainly more research is needed, but, if 
60% of the American public is considered at least overweight, it does not seem 
entirely plausible that such a large segment of the population is being 
discriminated against and this research, using 2000 data, does not show that at 
the overweight experience wage penalties.  It does not seem reasonable to use 
data nearly 25 years old to answer questions to 21st century problems. 
One last note: there is no doubt that obesity is associated with a myriad of 
adverse health conditions, such as diabetes and heart disease.  However, given 
that, in this research, there are virtually no negative effects of overweight on 
income, one has to ask: is it so bad to be a little overweight?  Flegal, et al (2005) 
asserts that the impact of obesity on mortality may have decreased over time, 
possibly due to improvements in health care.  Therefore, is it unreasonable to 
think that the impact of obesity on wages has decreased over time?  Further 
research will be needed to thoroughly investigate this question. 
While this chapter analyzed the effects of obesity on wages—health 
economics from a labor market perspective, Chapter 3 takes a different 
approach.  In Chapter 3, health economics is approached from the perspective of 
hospitals and Medicare.  That is, from industrial organization and public 
economics perspectives. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Demographic Variables
Logwageincome* 9.988837 0.87454 7.0012 12.6561
Age 40.36938 12.5665 18 65
Female 0.524539 0.49942 0 1
White 0.61357 0.48695 0 1
Black 0.139487 0.34647 0 1
Asian 0.027381 0.1632 0 1
American Indian/Eskimo 0.008783 0.09331 0 1
Hispanic 0.224126 0.41702 0 1
Married 0.607284 0.48838 0 1
Years of Education 12.65998 2.95117 1 17
NE 0.151886 0.35806 0 1
Midwest 0.214569 0.41039 0 1
South 0.386516 0.48697 0 1
West 0.247029 0.4313 0 1
Occupational Variables
Professional 0.136043 0.34285 0 1
Managerial 0.110126 0.31306 0 1
Sales 0.079473 0.27049 0 1
Clerical 0.106251 0.30817 0 1
Craftsman 0.089289 0.28517 0 1
Operative 0.048734 0.21532 0 1
Transportation Operative 0.035474 0.18498 0 1
Service 0.101602 0.30214 0 1
Nonfarm Labor 0.030481 0.17191 0 1
Farm Owner 0.004047 0.06349 0 1
Farm Labor 0.015412 0.12319 0 1
Industry Variables
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fisheries 0.020751 0.14256 0 1
Mining 0.00353 0.05931 0 1
Construction 0.055967 0.22987 0 1
Manufacturing 0.117961 0.32258 0 1
Transportation, Comunications, 
Utilities 0.053384 0.22481 0 1
Sales Industry 0.140692 0.34772 0 1
Finance, Insurance, Real Esta 0.048304 0.21442 0 1
Repair Services 0.055881 0.2297 0 1
Personal Services 0.024453 0.15446 0 1
Entertainment 0.011882 0.10836 0 1
Professional Services 0.187963 0.3907 0 1
Public Administration 0.040813 0.19786 0 1
Health Variables
Activity Limitation 0.051317 0.22065 0 1
Cognitive Limitation 0.022387 0.14794 0 1
Vision Impairment 0.042363 0.20142 0 1
Hearing Impairment 0.039694 0.19525 0 1
Stroke 0.011107 0.10481 0 1
Asthma 0.087395 0.28242 0 1
Emphysema 0.006974 0.08322 0 1
Anxiety/Depression 0.268727 0.44332 0 1
Better Health Than Last Year 0.188652 0.39125 0 1
Underweight 0.017393 0.13074 0 1
Obese 0.16041 0.367 0 1
Overweight 0.356208 0.4789 0 1
Normal weight 0.361633 0.48049 0 1
BMI 27.16093 5.4953 15.208 49.9172
Physical Activity 0.553901 0.49711 0 1
Smoker 0.245566 0.43044 0 1
*N=9753 for this variable
Table 2.1
Summary Statistics
N=11614
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Variable Underweight Normal Overweight Obese
Demographic Variables n=202 n=4200 n=4137 n=1863
Logwageincome* 9.708567 9.94642 10.08183 9.9597
Age 33.0198 38.3433 41.56684 42.3446
Female 0.7574257 0.61238 0.413585 0.50081
White 0.6188119 0.66238 0.603094 0.5679
Black 0.1485149 0.11 0.134639 0.17069
Asian 0.0990099 0.04429 0.020788 0.00859
American Indian/Eskimo 0.0148515 0.00571 0.008219 0.01449
Hispanic 0.1287129 0.19 0.247281 0.25228
Married 0.4257426 0.55738 0.649263 0.65164
Years of Education 12.96535 13.0012 12.63476 12.2195
NE 0.2079208 0.165 0.147933 0.12936
Midwest 0.2029703 0.22048 0.219724 0.20505
South 0.3613861 0.36095 0.365966 0.44552
West 0.2277228 0.25357 0.266377 0.22008
Occupational Variables
Professional 0.1485149 0.15452 0.139957 0.10467
Managerial 0.1089109 0.1119 0.117235 0.09984
Sales 0.0891089 0.08143 0.083394 0.07676
Clerical 0.1534653 0.11762 0.095238 0.09662
Craftsman 0.039604 0.07405 0.113609 0.0891
Operative 0.0346535 0.03976 0.05052 0.06119
Transportation Operative 0.019802 0.02 0.041576 0.04992
Service 0.0792079 0.10024 0.095963 0.11433
Nonfarm Labor 0.019802 0.03024 0.031424 0.03221
Farm Owner 0 0.0031 0.004109 0.00698
Farm Labor 0.019802 0.0119 0.019096 0.01664
Industry Variables
Agriculture, Forestry, 0.0148515 0.01929 0.02103 0.02738
Fisheries
Mining 0.0049505 0.00238 0.003384 0.00483
Construction 0.019802 0.04833 0.066715 0.05958
Manufacturing 0.0841584 0.10048 0.137781 0.11326
Transportation, Comm., 0.0346535 0.04095 0.063814 0.05797
Utilities
Sales Industry 0.1485149 0.145 0.14044 0.1401
Finance, Ins., Real Estate 0.0544554 0.05024 0.053179 0.04455
Repair Services 0.0792079 0.05548 0.055354 0.05743
Personal Services 0.0346535 0.02905 0.020788 0.02254
Entertainment 0.029703 0.01333 0.011361 0.01181
Professional Services 0.2029703 0.20929 0.17839 0.16747
Public Administration 0.0148515 0.03429 0.045685 0.04616
Health Variables
Activity Limitation 0.0544554 0.04024 0.044235 0.06119
Cognitive Limitation 0.029703 0.01952 0.020788 0.02308
Vision Impairment 0.0643564 0.03595 0.037467 0.04724
Hearing Impairment 0.049505 0.02857 0.044477 0.04724
Stroke 0.009901 0.00762 0.009911 0.01396
Asthma 0.0792079 0.07643 0.081943 0.09608
Emphysema 0.019802 0.00667 0.006527 0.00483
Better Health--Last Year? 0.2029703 0.17881 0.195794 0.18304
BMI 17.60082 22.3626 27.18777 32.1322
Physical Activity 0.5594059 0.61833 0.576021 0.46055
Smoker 0.3217822 0.27143 0.247522 0.20129
Table 2.2
Summary Statistics, by BMI category
N=11614
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Chapter 3 
An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health Care of Certain Medicare 
Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (H.R.2015, Public Law 105-33) set into 
motion the biggest changes to Medicare, the government health care program for 
the elderly, since the introduction of prospective payment in the early 1980’s.  In 
general, these changes were intended to modernize the program, expand 
benefits and extend the life of the Medicare trust fund.  Only ten years has 
passed since the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), therefore, 
the effects of the Medicare changes brought about by this legislation have yet to 
be fully researched academically.  To the best of my knowledge, no published 
economic research has examined the effects of the Medicare provision of the 
Balanced Budget Act examined in this paper.  This is understandable since 
adequate data has not been available.  However, the time has arrived to start 
examining certain effects of this landmark legislation.  This examination is 
important because the provisions in this law present financial incentives to the 
healthcare industry that can alter the care patients receive and the specific 
patients that various providers care for. 
This chapter examines the effects of one of the provisions of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997.  Specifically, I intend to examine whether the implementation 
of the post acute care transfer policy caused the length of stay for patients 
grouped in certain targeted diagnosis related groups (DRGs) to increase, 
keeping with the goal of the policy change.   
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The chapter is organized the following way: Section II will briefly 
summarize the Medicare program: a brief history, coverage and financing.  
Section III summarizes relevant literature, Section IV summarizes the motivations 
behind the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the changes brought about by the 
legislation, highlighting the selected provision I plan to analyze.  Section V 
presents methodologies, data and results, and Section VI concludes. 
Section II  
 
In a speech on May 22, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “We 
have the opportunity to move… toward the Great Society that demands an end to 
poverty and racial injustice to which we are totally committed in our time”.  The 
“Great Society” has come to refer to President Johnson’s programs that 
attempted to address problems in education, housing, jobs, civil rights, and 
health care, including Medicare, the health care program for the elderly.   
Medicare is the common name of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act part 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965.  Medicare benefits are extended to 
most people age 65 and older, persons entitled to Social Security or Railroad 
Retirement disability cash benefits for at least 2 years, most people with end-
stage renal disease, and other non-aged people who elect to pay a premium for 
coverage by the program.   
Medicare consists of three “parts”: Hospital insurance, also known as Part 
A, Supplementary medical insurance, also known as Part B and 
Medicare+Choice program, sometimes called Part C.  Medicare+Choice was 
established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and expanded beneficiaries’ 
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options for participation in private-sector health care plans.  In order to enroll in 
Part C, a beneficiary must already be enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B.    In 
2005, Medicare spending reached $342.0 billion in 2005, growing 9.3 percent 
compared to 10.3 percent in 2004 (www.cms.hhs.gov).   Medicare Part A 
primarily covers inpatient hospital care.  However, Medicare Part A coverage 
also includes: 
• Skilled Nursing Facility care: this is generally covered under Part A 
only if within 30 days of a hospitalization of three or more days and 
only if deemed medically necessary. A Skilled Nursing Facility, or SNF, 
is defined as a certified facility that provides inpatient skilled nursing 
care and related services to patients who require medical, nursing, or 
rehabilitative services, but not at the level of care provided by a 
hospital [www.medicare.gov]. 
• Home Health Agency care: coverage includes care provided by home 
health aides. 
• Hospice: care provided to terminally ill persons with life expectancies 
of six months or less and who elect to forgo standard Medicare 
benefits in favor of hospice care. 
Medicare Part B generally covers physician services.  Coverage extends 
to some services provided by chiropractors, podiatrists, dentists and 
optometrists.  Additionally, Part B covers emergency room services and 
outpatient services, including outpatient surgery and ambulance services.  
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Services not covered by Medicare include long-term nursing care and other 
needs such as dentures, eyeglasses, and hearing aids.   
On December 8, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003.  The 
Act will immediately provide Medicare beneficiaries with discounts on their 
prescription drugs as well as provide comprehensive Medicare prescription drug 
coverage effective January 1, 2006.  Starting in spring, 2004, Medicare 
beneficiaries will be able to enroll in a Medicare-approved discount card program 
(The Discount Card) that offers discounts on their prescription drugs.  The 
Discount Card was intended as a temporary program to provide immediate 
assistance in lowering prescription drug costs for Medicare beneficiaries during 
2004 and 2005.  
Medicare Part A is financed primarily through a mandatory payroll 
deduction, shown as the “FICA” tax on payroll deductions.  This tax is 1.45% of 
earnings collected from the employee and matched by an additional 1.45% of 
earnings, collected from the employer.  Self employed persons are required to 
pay 2.9% of earnings.  Medicare Part B is financed two ways: through premium 
payments ($93.50 per month in 2007, with about 4% of enrollees with higher 
incomes paying higher premiums based on income), generally deducted from 
monthly Social Security checks of those enrolled in Part B, and through 
contributions from the general revenue of the United States Treasury 
(www.cms.hhs.gov). 
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Beneficiaries are responsible for charges not covered by Medicare and for 
various cost-sharing features of the plans, such as copayments and deductibles. 
Beneficiaries may choose to pay for these charges through a third party such as 
private “medigap” insurance purchased by the beneficiary, or by Medicaid, if the 
person is eligible.  Medigap refers to private health insurance that pays for most 
of the health care service charges not covered under Parts A and B of Medicare 
(www.cms.hhs.gov). 
For hospital care covered under Part A, the beneficiary’s payment share 
includes a one-time deductible at the beginning of each benefit period ($992 in 
2007).  This is the beneficiary’s only cost for up to 60 days of inpatient hospital 
care.  If inpatient care is required beyond 60 days, additional copayments ($248 
per day in 2007) are required through the 90th day of a benefit period.  Beyond 
the 90th day, the beneficiary is responsible for an additional copayment of $496 
per day.  For Part B, the beneficiary’s payment share includes one annual 
deductible (currently $131), the monthly premiums, coinsurance payments for 
Part B services (20% of the medically allowed charges), and a deductible for 
blood and payment for any services that are not covered by Medicare 
(www.cms.hhs.gov).   
Before 1983, for Part A, Medicare’s payments to hospitals and doctors 
were made on a “reasonable cost” basis, meaning the payment was based on 
the actual cost of providing services, and did not include any costs unnecessary 
in the efficient delivery of services covered by a health insurance program.  Since 
1983, Medicare payments for most inpatient hospital services have been made 
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under the prospective payment system (PPS).  As mentioned earlier, under 
prospective payment, a specific predetermined amount is paid for each inpatient 
hospital stay’s Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) classification.  In some cases, 
the payment the hospital receives from Medicare is less than the hospital’s actual 
cost for providing the covered inpatient hospital services for the stay and in other 
cases it is more.  In either case, the hospital absorbs the loss or makes a profit.  
Certain payment adjustments exist for extraordinarily costly inpatient hospital 
stays, and payments for skilled nursing care and home health care are made 
under separate prospective payment systems.   
Before 1992, for Part B, physicians were paid on the basis of “reasonable 
charge”, initially defined as the lowest of 1) the physician’s actual charge, 2) the 
physician’s customary charge, or 3) the prevailing charge for similar services in 
that locality.  Starting in 1992, allowed charges were defined as the lesser of 1) 
the submitted charges, or 2) the amount determined by a fee schedule based on 
a relative value scale.  Most hospital outpatient services are reimbursed on a 
prospective payment system, and home health care is reimbursed under the 
same system as Part A.  In short, the Medicare program covered 35.8 million 
people aged 65 and older in 2005, plus 6.7 million disabled persons (include 
reference to 2006 annual report).   
Section III 
Review of Relevant Literature 
The Medicare Prospective Payment System has interested researchers 
since its introduction in 1983.  Many studies have been done on the effects of 
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moving from a retrospective (“cost-based”) payment system to a prospective 
payment system12  For example, Feder, et al (1987) examined changes in 
Medicare costs as a result of implementation of this system.  They show that, in 
the early 1980’s, hospitals paid through the prospective payment had significantly 
lower increases in Medicare costs and greater decreases in Medicare use than 
other hospitals not affected by prospective payment at that time.   Hodgkin and 
McGuire (1994) and Shen (2003), looked at prospective payment-induced 
changes in intensity or quality of care.  The model developed by Hodgkin and 
McGuire suggested an important role for the level of prospective payment, 
regardless of marginal incentives.  Shen found that financial pressures adversely 
affected health outcomes in the short run, but patient mortality was not affected 
past one year from the admission date. Ellis and McGuire (1986) developed a 
model where physicians choose services provided to their patients.  They 
showed that if physicians undervalue benefits to patients relative to hospital 
profits, the prospective payment system can lead to too few services provided to 
patients.   
Some research has been published that examines the Medicare 
provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  While they are mainly descriptive 
in nature, they are worth mentioning here.  Angelelli, et al. (2003), examined how 
rural hospitals altered their post acute (or, post hospital) and long-term care 
strategies after the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  The study interviewed 540 
rural hospital discharge planners in 1997 and reinterviewed 513 of those 
                                                 
12Prospective payment is a system of reimbursement in which Medicare payment is made based 
on a predetermined amount.  The payment for a particular service is generally based on the 
diagnosis related group for that service. 
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discharge planners in 2000 in order to describe how rural hospitals formed new 
and altered organizational strategies during a period of change13.  The results 
implied that, after the Balanced Budget Act, rural hospitals increased their 
reliance on swing beds14 and relationships with outside health care providers.  
Spector, Cohen and Pesis-Katz (2004) described the pattern of change in home 
care use and expenditures before and after 1996.  The authors found that, after 
increasing dramatically between 1978 and 1996, formal home-care use and 
expenditures fell between 1996 and 1999.  The authors stated this was largely 
due to a decrease in Medicare funding as a result of the Balanced Budget Act.  
After the passage of the Balanced Budget Act, fewer skilled services were 
provided to the elderly population and more unskilled services were provided to 
the nonelderly population.  The implication here is the increasing role of state 
governments in funding home care after the Balanced Budget Act.  Like the 
above mentioned studies, the analysis in this paper aims to examine the effects 
of modifying an existing payment system. 
Section IV 
Motivations of the Balanced Budget Act 
 
Over time, one of the biggest motivations of changes to Medicare policy 
was the pending collapse of Medicare Part A.  As mentioned earlier, Part A is 
financed through “FICA” payroll taxes.  However, the fund’s annual revenues and 
                                                 
13 Discharge planning is a process used to decide what a patient needs for a smooth move from 
one level of care to another, for example, planning a move from a hospital to a nursing home.  
Discharge planners are generally social workers or some other professional. 
14 A swing bed is defined as a hospital bed that can be used to provide either acute care or long 
term care. 
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expenses generally do not coincide, implying that the fund could run out of 
money.  By early 1997, Medicare Part A was forecasted to become insolvent 
during 2001 (Guterman 2000).  
Between 1990 and 1996, Medicare spending was increasing in every 
area; however, some areas were increasing more than others (Guterman 2000): 
• Hospital outpatient services increased by almost 10% annually. 
• Payments to skilled nursing facilities increased by 20% annually. 
• Payments to home health agencies increased by 30% annually. 
Reasons cited for these increases were increased use of home health 
services and increases in payments for skilled nursing facilities.  Despite the 
concerns about spending increases in these non-hospital areas, hospital 
inpatient spending was still expected to make up the large proportion of the 
increase (31%) in Medicare spending between 1996 and 2002 (Guterman 2000). 
The impending passage of the Balanced Budget Act and its changes in 
Medicare payments resulted in opposition from the healthcare industry and also 
from the industry’s allies in Congress.  For example, On June 10, 1999, Tom 
Scully, President and CEO of the Federation of American Health Systems, in 
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, claimed the transfer policy in 
particular was “ill-advised” and fundamentally inconsistent with the essence of 
the Prospective Payment System.  Scully claimed the purpose of the PPS was to 
reward hospitals for efficient behavior; one indicator of which is shorter hospital 
stays.  Furthermore, the transfer policy is unfair to areas of the country where 
lengths of stay are shorter than average.  When patients are transferred for 
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legitimate purposes, these hospitals are penalized with lower reimbursement 
because they have better practice patterns and shorter lengths of stay 
(Federation of American Health Systems, 1999). 
As a result of such backlash, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act of 1999.  The BBRA, as it is known, rolled back many of the 
provisions set forth in the Balanced Budget Act.  A discussion of those provisions 
affected by this legislation is beyond the scope of this paper, but the provision 
discussed in this paper was not affected (Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission 2000).  
Medicare Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
 
In this paper, I plan to focus on the changes to Medicare Part A.  
Specifically, I intend to examine the effects of implementing of the Post Acute 
Care Transfer Policy.  Information about this provision was obtained by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  CMS is the government 
agency that administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs and, prior to July 
1, 2001, was known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). 
Certain Hospital Discharges to Post Acute Care 
 
The Balanced Budget Act instructed the Health Care Financing 
Administration (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) to identify 
10 diagnosis related groups (DRGs) to test the feasibility of extending the 
prospective payment system (PPS) acute care transfer payment policy to post 
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acute settings, such as nursing homes or skilled nursing facilities15.  Prior to the 
passage of the Balanced Budget Act, the only inpatient discharges considered 
transfers for the purposes of reimbursement were those discharged from one 
hospital and admitted at another hospital the same day.  That policy was based 
on the idea that it was inappropriate to pay a hospital a full DRG payment for less 
than a complete course of treatment.    However, when prospective payment was 
first implemented, the perception was that hospital care and post acute care, 
such as home health or skilled nursing facility care, were complementary.   
Over time, however, health policy analysts began to rethink this 
relationship and considered the possibility that health care providers were shifting 
care away from relatively more expensive inpatient settings to relatively less 
expensive post acute care settings.  Providers facing a fixed payment for 
services provided have financial incentives to separate the product by billing 
separately for individual services that were thought to be bundled together.  
Hospitals may shift some of those services to another setting, referred to as “site 
of care substitution”.  For example, a facility may shift diagnostic services, such 
as laboratory work or X-rays, to an outpatient department or a doctor’s office.  
Also, inpatient costs can be reduced by discharging patients earlier to long-term 
care, rehabilitation facilities, skilled nursing facilities or home health care, all of 
which are reimbursed under separate payment systems.   
According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPac), the 
strongest evidence that site of care substitution occurred is that, as of 1999, the 
                                                 
15 A diagnosis-related group is defined as a case type that identifies patients with similar 
conditions and types of care.  Currently, there are 495 DRGs in Medicare’s Prospective Payment 
System. 
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Medicare length of stay had fallen 31% over the previous ten years, while the 
length of stay for all other patients only fell 18%.  Hospitals covered by 
prospective payment have a strong financial incentive to discharge Medicare 
patients to a post-acute setting as soon as possible.  Since per-case payment is 
not affected by the discharge, the provider keeps any savings from the shorter 
stays.   
Other trends supporting site substitution according to MedPac (1999) were 
that:  1) Increases in the volume of various types of post-acute care coincided 
with the large reduction in the length of stay; 2) the decline in the length of stay 
has been the greatest for DRG’s where the use of post-acute care is most 
prevalent.  Hospitals that operate post-acute care services experienced a larger 
drop in length of stay than those that do not.  It should be stressed that MedPac 
does not present these observations as the results of thorough economic 
analysis, but simply as observations documented by MedPac and its 
predecessor organizations.16  
Therefore, the Post Acute Care Transfer Policy was implemented to 
examine whether or not it would be suitable to apply this already existing transfer 
policy to those DRGs that are generally associated with frequent use of post 
acute care.  The Health Care Financing Administration began by identifying the 
20 DRGs with the highest share of post acute care discharges conditional on no 
fewer than 14,000 cases being discharged to a post acute provider.  The 10 pilot 
                                                 
16 The predecessor organizations were the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission and 
the Physician Payment Review Commission, which merged in 1997 to become MedPac. 
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DRGs were then chosen based on volume and percent of discharges occurring 
early in the hospital stay.  Table 3.1 summarizes the 20 DRGs.   
After October 1st, 1998, hospitals would not receive the full DRG payment 
for patients transferred to post acute providers more than one day less than the 
geometric mean length of stay (GLOS) for that patient’s DRG.17  The main intent 
was to decrease the financial incentive to prematurely transfer patients from 
hospitals to acute care settings.  
After the Balanced Budget Act, to qualify as a post acute transfer, 
inpatient admissions to post acute care facilities must occur on the same 
calendar day as the acute care discharge.  Home health transfers must occur 
within a three day period post-discharge.  The payment policy calls for twice the 
per diem reimbursement rate on the first day of the inpatient acute care stay and 
the per diem on each following day until the full DRG payment is reached.  The 
payment is equal to (and does not exceed) the full DRG amount when the length 
of stay of the patient is one day less than the national geometric mean length of 
stay for that DRG.  That is, patients transferred on or after one day below the 
geometric mean length of stay will generate full DRG payments for the hospital.  
For 3 of the 10 pilot DRGs, (209, 210 and 211) the payment scheme differed 
because these DRGs incurred a disproportionate percentage of total costs on the 
first day of hospitalization.  CMS estimated that this lower per diem payment for 
short stay (1 day less than the geometric mean length of stay) would yield 0.6% 
                                                 
17 Later in this chapter, these patients will be referred to as “shortstay” patients.  The geometric 
mean length of stay for a given DRG in each fiscal year (FY) is based on an average over all 
patients grouped into that DRG over the previous FY and is published sometime prior to each FY 
in the Federal Register. 
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decrease in per case program payments (MedPac 1999).  For example, suppose 
a patient is grouped into a DRG affected by the Balanced Budget Act.  Prior to 
the Balanced Budget Act, this patient could be admitted to an acute care 
hospital, discharged to a post acute care facility and the hospital would receive  
the full DRG payment for the patient, regardless of the length of stay in the 
hospital.  After the passage of the Balanced Budget Act, if the hospital were to 
discharge the patient after a length of stay that was shorter than the geometric 
mean length of stay minus one day, then the DRG payment would be less than 
the full amount. The resulting incentive is for hospitals to increase the lengths of 
stay for patients grouped into one of the pilot DRGs.  
This provision provides an interesting avenue for research, especially 
since this policy is an experiment.  The pilot DRGs were chosen with the idea 
that it could be extended to other DRG’s.  To the best of my knowledge, no 
published academic research has investigated this issue.  The Balanced Budget 
Act required the Health Care Financing Administration (now the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services) on the implementation of this policy and its 
effect on hospital treatment patterns and Medicare expenditures.  One year’s 
worth of claims data were used to evaluate the impact of the post acute care 
transfer payment policy (Gilman, et al. 2000).  While no econometric analysis 
was performed in that report, the authors find that total discharges in the 10 
postacute care transfer DRGs fell 10.9 percent between the first half of FY1998 
and the first half of FY1999.  The number of post acute care transfers fell by 13.4 
percent. The overall post acute care transfer rate fell from 63.4 to 61.6 percent, 
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or 2.8 percent.  The authors note that the results suggest that hospitals may have 
opted to provide care for patients that would have been discharged to post acute 
care.  The authors also state that these results should be treated as preliminary 
given the limited data available at that time.  This study has not been updated.  
The analyses performed here, while relatively simple, represent an analytical 
improvement over that report.  In addition, my post-implementation data extends 
through all of 2000. 
Section V 
Data Description 
 
The primary dataset used in this analysis is the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP), sponsored by the Agency of Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ).  HCUP includes the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), a 
sample of inpatient data from approximately 1,000 hospitals.  They are publicly 
available data that are available from 1988-2001 and currently include data from 
8 states in 1988 to 33 states in 2001.  They contain information on diagnoses, 
admission and discharge status such as whether the patient was admitted 
through the emergency room or on a weekend and whether the patient was 
discharged into post-acute care, to home, or died.  Patient demographics and 
basic hospital characteristics including ownership type, region, teaching status 
and bed size are also included in the dataset.   
Data from 1998-2000 are employed for these analyses.  The final sample 
used in this study includes only patients age 65 and older, listing Medicare as the 
primary payer, discharged alive, that fall under one of the 20 DRGs considered 
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for or included in the policy.  The final sample includes 717,784 observations.  
Summary statistics are listed in Table 3.2. 
Interesting characteristics to note: the average age of the discharged 
patients is just over 78 years and females represent 62% of the sample.  In 
addition, DRG 209 (Major Joint Limb Reattachment Procedures of Lower 
Extremity) is the most prevalent diagnosis related group represented here, 
consisting of 19.2% of the observations.  DRG 264 (Skin Graft and/or 
Debridement for Skin Ulcer or Cellulitis with complications or comorbidities) is the 
least common DRG, consisting of only .15% of the observations.  Eighty-five 
percent of the patients in the sample are white, 7% black.    
The summary statistics also include descriptions of dummy variables used 
in this research.  At a glance, one notes that about 86% of the observations 
represent patients discharged after October 1st, 1998 and 55% of the 
observations represent patients grouped into the “pilot” DRGs.  Nearly 70% of 
the observations represent patients transferred to some type of post acute care.   
Table 3.3 presents most variables ultimately employed in the analyses.18  
While the variables used in the regressions are relatively simple, they merit some 
explanation.  The dummy variable PostBBA equals 1 if the patient was 
discharged in the 4th quarter of 1998 (the 4th quarter occurring, of course, after 
10/01/98) and anytime during 1999.  This variable equals 0 if the patient was 
discharged during quarters 1-3 of 1998.  PilotDRG is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the patient was grouped into one of the “pilot” DRGs and 0 otherwise.  
PostBBAPilot is an interaction variable between PostBBA and PilotDRG.  It 
                                                 
18Other dummy variables will be generated as needed later but are not included in this table. 
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equals 1 if the patient is grouped into a “pilot” DRG and discharged after October 
1, 1998 (hence making them “eligible” for the new policy treatment) and 0 
otherwise.  The other interaction variables are self-explanatory.  In addition, 
dummy variables exist for each race, each hospital bed size, each hospital 
location/teaching status, each geographic region (based on U.S. Census regions) 
and each form of hospital control.   
While the hospital characteristics appear straightforward, it is worthwhile 
to briefly explain them.  According to HCUP, the organization administering the 
dataset, the bed categories are specific to the hospital’s location and teaching 
status.  Cut off points were chosen such that approximately one-third of the 
hospitals in a region and location/teaching combination would be in each bed 
size category.  The bed size categories are shown in Table 3.4.  Hospital location 
is considered urban if the hospital is located in a metropolitan statistical area.  
Hospitals are considered teaching facilities if it has an American Medical 
Association-approved residency program, is a member of the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals (COTH) or has a ratio of full-time equivalent interns and 
residents to beds of .25 or higher.  Since rural teaching hospitals are not 
common, there are no rural teaching/nonteaching categories.  Also, according to 
HCUP, when there was an appropriate sample of hospitals (as with southern 
rural, southern urban non-teaching and western urban non-teaching), hospitals 
were classified as public, non-profit (or voluntary), and for-profit (or proprietary).  
For other strata (north central rural and western rural) a collapsed category of 
public versus private was employed with the voluntary and proprietary hospitals 
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combined to form one “private” category.  HCUP adds that for all other region 
and location/teaching status combinations, stratification based on control was not 
advisable. 
Econometric Modeling and Results 
Analyses of All Observations Grouped into the 20 DRGs 
The policy change to Medicare creates variation in length of stay for 
patients within DRGs included in the policy over time, before and after the policy 
implementation.  In addition, the policy creates variation between the “pilot” 
DRGs (that is, those included in the policy and the “other” DRGs (those 
considered for inclusion, but ultimately left out).  As mentioned, this policy 
change affected Medicare reimbursement for the “pilot” DRGs after 10/01/98.  
Knowledge of this date, along with the “pilot” and “other” DRGs, allows one to 
identify “treatment” and “control” groups in order to gauge the effects of 
extending the Medicare transfer policy to post acute transfer cases.  This 
identification will allow examination of the data (often referred to as a “difference 
in differences” methodology) similar to that in other studies of public policy.   
For example, Gruber (2000) assesses the optimal size of disability 
insurance programs by investigating the elasticity of labor force participation with 
respect to generosity of benefits.  He accomplishes this by looking at Canada, 
which operates two disability insurance programs, one for Quebec, and one for 
the rest of Canada. Gruber uses a “difference-in-difference” estimate to focus on 
the labor supply effect in the large relative change in benefits in the rest of 
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Canada relative to Quebec.  His results reinforce the idea that there was a 
response in labor supply to the policy change. 
Gruber and Poterba (1994) look at the changes brought about by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.  Specifically, they examine the effect of the change in the 
tax treatment of insurance purchases by self-employed individuals on the 
demand for health insurance by self-employed persons.  They employ a 
difference-in-difference technique to estimate price effects on insurance demand.  
They find that an increase in the cost of insurance coverage reduces the 
probability that a self-employed single person will be insured by 1.8 percentage 
points. 
Yelowitz (1995) used a difference in differences method to help assess 
the impact of losing public health insurance on labor market decisions of women 
by examining Medicaid eligibility expansions targeted toward young children.  
The legislative change examined in this Medicaid study creates three dimensions 
of variation: in the budget constraints for mothers of different ages within a state, 
across states and over time.  This creates “treatment” and “control” groups to 
“gauge the effects of moving the income eligibility limit for Medicaid to a higher 
level”.  He finds that increasing the income limit for Medicaid resulted in 
increases in labor force participation and decreases in AFDC participation among 
affected women, with large results for women who had ever been married. 
As mentioned earlier, the policy change implemented by the Balanced 
Budget Act targets those patients with length of stay that is less than or equal to 
the geometric mean length of stay minus one day for their DRG in a fiscal year.  
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However, it might be useful to first begin with an inclusive analysis of the data to 
first see if the legislation had effects further reaching than the targeted group.   
The first analysis performed here will be simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) which regresses length of stay on exogenous variables, which  includes 
dummy variables indicating “pilot” DRG status and whether or not the discharge 
took place after 10/01/98 (PostBBA). 
  A simple OLS regression may take on the following form: 
 (1) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3 PilotDRG + β4PostBBA + β5 
(PostBBA*PilotDRG) +εih
In this regression, “Individual” represents patient characteristics such as 
gender, age, race, etc.  “Hospital” represents hospital characteristics, such as 
ownership structure, region, etc.  As mentioned, dummy variables are included 
for PilotDRG (=1 if the patient’s DRG is among the “pilot” DRG’s affected by the 
policy change), PostBBA (=1 indicates the discharge occurred on or after 
10/01/98), and a term which interacts those variables (PostBBA*PilotDRG), since 
“eligibility” for this policy varies by DRG and time.  The interaction equals 1 if the 
patient was assigned one of the 10 “pilot” DRGs and was discharged on or after 
10/01/98 and equals 0 otherwise.    
One should ask whether or not it is necessary to take into account the 
effects of possible anticipation of the policy or any lag effects on the part of 
hospitals in their response to the policy after its implementation.  The following is 
proposed: because the Balanced Budget Act was signed into law over a year 
before the provision was to go into effect, hospitals should have had full 
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knowledge of the provision.  One could argue that, if hospitals were engaging in 
behavior such that patients were being transferred “too early” for the purpose of 
financial gain, there would be no reason for them to alter their behavior before 
the provision went into effect.  In fact, it seems reasonable to expect this 
behavior to continue as long as possible, until the incentive to do so is taken 
away.  In this case, the incentive to transfer patients early would end 10/01/98.  
On and after this date, discharges would be subject to the new policy, and any 
financial incentive to discharge patients early would be gone19. 
The results of the initial regression are presented in Table 3.5.  Note that 
the regression is run relative to a white male, discharged from a medium-sized, 
urban, non-teaching, private for-profit hospital in the northeast.  As can be seen, 
nearly all the variables are statistically significant at conventional levels.  The 
length of stay for females is, on average, .60 days less than males.  Hispanics, 
blacks, Asians and those categorizing themselves into the other racial category 
all, on average, have lengths of stay that are longer relative to whites.  This is not 
entirely surprising, since this can reflect a poorer health status of minorities.  
Relative to the northeast, patients in all other regions of the country have 
significantly shorter lengths of stay.  This might not be unexpected since there 
could exist relatively more hospitals, especially in the south and certain areas of 
the west, that are more dependent on programs like Medicare and are more 
sensitive to financial incentives presented by such programs.  All hospital control 
types were statistically significant with decreased lengths of stay relative to the 
omitted category, private, for-profit hospitals.  One explanation for the positive 
                                                 
19To be thorough, however, the issue of timing is addressed later in the chapter. 
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sign on Large Hospital is that more complicated cases are routed to larger, rather 
than smaller facilities.  Age accounted for an insignificant slight decline in length 
of stay.   
Because the intent is to examine the Post Acute Care Transfer policy on 
length of stay, PostBBA, Pilot DRG and PostBBAPilot are the main variables of 
interest here.  However, the results yielded here are not entirely expected.  The 
PostBBA coefficient, .0605915 tells us that being discharged on or after 10/01/98 
is associated, on average, with only a very slight increase in length of stay for all 
20 DRGs considered for this policy, regardless of patient LOS and transfer 
status.  However, it is not significant by conventional measures.  The large 
PilotDRG coefficient, -1.509, is statistically significant and tells us that discharges 
grouped into one of the 10 pilot DRGs is associated, on average, with a length of 
stay of about a day and a half less than the non-Pilot DRGs.  This might not be 
entirely unexpected, since nine months of the data come from before the 
implementation date of the policy.  The coefficient could reflect shorter stays 
before the policy change.  The interaction variable, PostBBAPilot (which equals 1 
if the patient was grouped into one of the pilot DRGs and discharged after 
10/01/98) was statistically significant at conventional levels, but still fairly small, 
.301, implying that patients in “pilot” DRGs discharged after 10/01/98 had very 
small increases in length of stay—less than a half a day, on average—relative to 
other patients.  This is expected, given the goal of the policy.  That is, it would be 
expected that this interaction would have a positive and significant coefficient, 
 81
reflecting the idea that hospitals would no longer have the financial incentive to 
discharge patients early who were grouped into the 10 “pilot” DRGs.   
Because of the relatively small magnitude of the PostBBAPilot variable in 
the initial regression, a natural next step is to investigate whether or not there 
were any changes in length of stay associated with any of the individual DRGs.  
Therefore, another OLS regression is performed.  Dummy variables are 
generated for each of the 20 DRGs and then each of these dummy variables are 
interacted with the PostBBA variable to arrive at an estimate of the change in 
length of stay after 10/01/98 associated with DRG i.  The regression now takes 
on the following form:  
(2) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3DRGi +β4PostBBA +        
β5(PostBBA*DRGi) + εih 
By including each of the DRG variables, it can be determined  whether or 
not there was any change in length of stay for patients grouped in the individual 
DRGs, rather than looking at an average over all DRGs.  Perhaps there was no 
change for some DRGs and significant changes for others, which is reasonable 
given the heterogeneity of the diagnosis groups.  The results of this regression 
are contained in Table 3.6 and the regression, as before, is performed relative to 
a white male, staying at a medium-sized, urban, non-teaching, private for-profit 
hospital in the northeast.  Among the pilot DRGs, DRG 14 (specific 
cerebrovascular disorders except transient ischemic attack) is omitted and 
among the non-pilot DRGs, DRG 1 (craniotomy, >17, excluding trauma) is 
omitted. 
 82
Again, the variables of most interest are the interaction variables.  One 
would expect the coefficients on the pilot DRG interaction variables to be 
positive, reflecting increased lengths of stay relative to the control group, since 
the policy’s goal was to keep hospitals from discharging patients “too early” to 
post acute care.   
This regression yields some interesting, but again unexpected, results.  
Overall, there does not appear to be evidence that hospitals significantly 
increased length of stay over all pilot DRGs after 10/01/98.  In fact, in some 
cases, it was quite the opposite.  For pilot DRGs 209, major joint limb 
reattachment procedures of the lower extremity, and 236, fractures of hip and 
pelvis, coefficients were negative and statistically significant at conventional 
levels, indicating that for patients grouped in these DRGs and discharged after 
10/01/98, lengths of stay actually declined relative to DRG 14, specific 
cerebrovascular disorders except transient ischemic attack..  Other pilot DRGs 
did experience some increase in length of stay: 113, amputation for circulatory 
system disorders excluding upper limb and toe; 210, hip and femur procedures 
except major joint age>17, with complications;  263, skin graft and/or 
debridement for skin ulcer or cellulitis with complications; and 483, tracheostomy 
except for face, mouth and neck diagnosis.  Being discharged after 10/01/98 
made no significant difference at all for DRGs 211, hip and femur procedures 
except major joint age>17 without complications; 264, skin graft and/or 
debridement for skin ulcer or cellulites without complications, and 429, organic 
disturbances and mental retardation.  Therefore, one could conclude at this point 
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that there may be other factors affecting length of stay other than financial 
incentives, such as the nature of the patient’s disease and technology.  This 
should certainly be examined further. 
One important note about the previous analyses is that it does not control 
for transfer status.  Since this provision of the Balanced Budget Act is aimed at 
transfer patients, an analysis must be performed that separates out transfer 
patients from non-transfer patients.  This should provide a better idea of just what 
happened after the Balanced Budget Act provision went into effect.  Another OLS 
regression is performed, taking on the form: 
(3) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3Transferi + β4PostBBA+ 
β5PilotDRG +β6PostBBAPilotTransfer + εih 
For this regression, two new variables are generated: Transfer equals 1 if the 
patient (regardless of DRG or discharge date) was transferred to post-acute care.    
PostBBAPilotTransfer equals 1 if the observation represents a patient transferred 
to post acute care after 10/01/98 and was grouped into one of the 10 “pilot” 
DRGs.  An observation is considered a transfer patient if the patient was 
discharged to a short-term hospital, skilled nursing facility, intermediate care or 
some other type of facility.  The regression results are contained in Table 3.7. 
Again, the regression yields unexpected results.  The primary variables of 
interest are Transfer, PostBBA, PilotDRG, and PostBBAPilotTransfer.  The 
coefficients are all statistically significant and show, on average, that transfer 
patients stayed 2.62 days longer than non-transfer patients, over all DRGs and 
discharge dates.  Patients discharged after 10/01/98, on average, stayed in the 
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hospital only .50 days longer than other patients, over all DRGs.  Patients 
categorized into one of the ten pilot DRGs had, on average, lengths of stay that 
were 1.38 less than other patients, regardless of discharge date or transfer 
status.  The coefficient on PostBBAPilotTransfer is expected to be positive, since 
the aim of the policy is to keep patients grouped into the pilot DRGs from being 
transferred prematurely to post acute care.  However, this coefficient is -.63, 
indicating that these patients discharged to post-acute care after 10/01/98 
actually were in the hospital about a half day less relative to other patients in the 
sample. 
As with the previous regressions, this result raises the question as to how 
length of stay for transfer patients grouped into the individual DRGs changed, if 
at all.  Therefore an additional OLS regression is performed of the following form:  
(4) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3DRGi +β4PostBBA + β5Transfer + 
β6PostBBADRGiTransfer + εih 
Here, PostBBADRGiTransfer is an interaction term that equals 1 if the patient 
was grouped into DRG i and transferred to post acute care after 10/01/98.  A 
variable is generated for all 20 DRGs, with the interacted variables for DRGs 14 
and 1 omitted from the regression to prevent the dummy variable trap, that is, an 
exact linear relationship between the dummy variables and the intercept 
(Kennedy 1998).  Results are presented in Table 3.8. 
All coefficients on the pilot DRG interaction variables are statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  As with the earlier regression, not all of the 
patients grouped into pilot DRGs experienced increases in length of stay.  In fact, 
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patients grouped into DRGs 113, 209, 210, 211, 236, 264 and 429 experienced 
decreases in length of stay.   On the other hand, DRGs 263 and 483 experienced 
increases in length of stay.  As noted earlier, if hospitals were prematurely 
transferring patients only for financial gain prior to the effective date of the 
Balanced Budget Act provision, it is expected that the pilot DRG interaction 
variables’ coefficients would be positive, indicating longer lengths of stay relative 
to the control group.  However, it is not entirely clear at this point why some 
coefficients are positive and others negative.  The positive coefficients on DRGs 
263 and 483 could reflect the more complicated nature of those DRGs.  DRG 
483, tracheostomy except for face, mouth and neck diagnosis is often the highest 
total cost DRG for hospitals because it involves critically ill patients that require 
prolonged mechanical ventilation and use significant intensive care resources 
(Van Boerum, et al. 1999).  DRG 263, skin graft and/or debridement for skin ulcer 
or cellulitis with complications is a DRG that can be associated with patients with 
conditions such as diabetes, with the phrase “with complications” distinguishing it 
from the similar DRG 264, skin graft and/or debridement for skin ulcer or cellulitis 
without complications .   
To complement the analysis of the change in length of stay for transfer 
patients, I reran the regressions as specified by equations (1) and (2) conditional 
on the patient being transferred to post acute care.  Results are presented in 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10.   
Running equation (1) conditional on the patient’s transfer status does yield 
the expected results with regards to the PostBBAPilot and PostBBA variables.  
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The PostBBAPilot variable is statistically significant and the PostBBA variable is 
small, positive and significant.  The interaction variable is very small, but it is 
significant.  The regression is then performed using DRG interaction variables, as 
in equation (2), conditional on the patients’ transfer status and is presented in 
Table XIV.  The interaction variables for DRGs 113, 263, and 483 are positive 
and significant, while the variables for DRGs 209 and 236 are negative and 
significant.    
To enhance this analysis, it would be interesting to be able to estimate 
elasticities in order to see the effects changes in the independent variable on 
LOS.  In this case, we can employ a semilog model of the form: 
(5) lnLOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3 PilotDRG + β4PostBBA + β5 
(PostBBA*PilotDRG) +εih
Of course, this is referred to as a semi-log model because only the regressand 
(LOS) is in logarithmic form.  Otherwise, the regression follows the same form as 
equation (1). 
When the dependent variable is in log form and the independent variables 
are linear, the usual interpretation of the coefficient is that, multiplied by 100, it is 
equal to the percentage effect of that variable on the dependent variable.  
However, as Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) showed, this is an incorrect 
interpretation for dummy variables, since they are not continuous.  A correction 
must be performed on the dummy variables in order to make accurate 
interpretations of the variables’ effects on length of stay.  The correction takes on 
the form: 
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C=ln(1+G) 
Here, C is the coefficient of the dummy variable and G is the actual 
relative effect on LOS of each of the dummy variables.  Regression results are 
presented in Table 3.11, with Table 3.12 containing correct interpretations of the 
dummy variable coefficients 
Addressing first the patient characteristics, one sees that the race 
variables have the greatest percentage influence on length of stay.  As with 
earlier analyses, this is not surprising, since it could reflect the generally poorer 
health status of minorities.  Among hospital characteristics, the regional variables 
contribute the largest changes.  Again, this could represent regional variation in 
hospitals’ dependence on Medicare. 
Among our variables of interest, being grouped into a pilot DRG—
regardless of LOS, transfer status or date of discharge—is associated with a 
nearly 20% decrease in LOS. On the other hand, being discharged after 10/01/98 
is only associated, on average, with a 1% decrease in LOS.  Discharges grouped 
into pilot DRGs after 10/01/98 is only associated with an average increase in 
LOS of less than 5%, however, this result is expected given the aim of the policy.   
The issue of timing was previously addressed.  It was stated that, since 
the Balanced Budget Act presented health care providers with an effective date 
for the policy change, that it is not likely that providers would have any incentive 
to change behavior until that date.  However, it would be a good idea to address 
the possibility that it may have taken providers longer than 10/01/98 to adjust 
their behavior.   
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To do this, two new dummy variables are generated.  Lagpostbba equals 
1 if the discharge occurred anytime in 1999.  This effectively extends the pre-
Balanced Budget Act period through all of 1998.  Lagpostbbapilotdrg is simply 
the interaction between lagpostbba and pilotdrg.  The regression now takes on 
the form: 
(6) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3PilotDRGi + β4LagPostBBAi+ 
β5LagPostBBAPilotdrgi + εih 
Results are presented in Table 3.13.  Discharges occurring on or after 
1/01/99 still have lengths of stay that, on average, were only slightly more 
compared to the pre-BBA period.  The coefficient on lagpostbbapilotdrg is 
significant but still relatively small.  
For completeness, I extend the idea of a “lag period” to the regression 
originally represented by equation (2).  That is, include the individual DRG 
dummy variables, this time interacting each with the lagpostbba variable.  This 
regression now takes the following form (with results in Table 3.14): 
(7) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3LagPostBBA + β4DRGi+ 
β3(LagPostBBADRGi)i + εih 
Again, the purpose is to see if I can identify any “lag effect” associated 
with any of the individual DRGs and one can see that redefining the pre/post 
BBA period has little effect on the coefficients.  Compared to the regression in 
Table 3.6, there is no change in the coefficients’ signs, and little difference in the 
coefficients’ magnitudes.   
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Lastly, the idea of a “lag period” is extended to the regressions that control 
for transfer status, originally represented by equations (3) and (4), with results 
originally shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  These regressions are now in the 
following forms: 
(8) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3Transferi+β4PilotDRG 
+β5LagPostBBA + β5(LagPostBBAPilotTransfer)i+ εih 
(9) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3LagPostBBA + β4Transfer + 
β5DRGi + β3(LagPostBBADRGiTransfer)i + εih 
The results of equation (8) are presented in Table 3.15.  As with the other 
“lag” regressions, little has changed relative to the original regression in Table 
3.7.  The signs of the transfer dummy variables have not changed, and there has 
been minimal change in the coefficients’ magnitudes.  The same holds true for 
the regression represented by equation (9).  Shown in Table 3.16, signs did not 
change relative to the regression in Table 3.8 and there were only slight changes 
in magnitude.   
On the other hand, it is possible that hospitals anticipated the law and did 
not want to appear to be exploiting the loophole presented by the previous 
payment system.  Therefore, the pre- and post-BBA periods are again redefined.  
A new dummy variable is generated, AnticipateBBA,  that equals 1 if the 
discharge occurred on or after June 1, 1998, effectively shortening the pre-BBA 
period a whole quarter before the legislation went into effect.  Similar to the 
above analysis, AnticipateBBAPilotDRG is the interaction between 
AnticipateBBA and PilotDRG.  The regression is of the following form: 
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(10) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3PilotDRG + β4AnticipateBBA+ 
β5AnticipateBBAPilotdrg + εih 
Results are presented in Table 2.17.  Those patients discharged after June 1, 
1998 had, on average, a .05 day shorter hospital stay than other patients, 
however, this coefficient was not significant by conventional standards.  While 
the coefficient has changed relative to the analogous dummy variable in Table 
3.5, the magnitudes of each are small, so it is difficult to tell if there’s any real 
difference between the two.  Consistent with other regressions, PilotDRG has a 
negative coefficient.  Those patients discharged after June 1, 1998 and who fall 
into one of the pilot DRG categories had lengths of stay that were, on average, 
.35 days longer than other patients. 
Again, this idea is extended to a regression that includes individual DRG 
dummy variables interacted with the AnticipateBBA variable: 
(11) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3 AnticipateBBA + β4DRGi + 
β5(AnticipateBBADRGi)i + εih 
Results are presented in Table 3.18.  Once again, redefining the pre/post-BBA 
period does not make much difference in the coefficients. Finally, the idea of 
“anticipating” the BBA is extended to the regressions that control for transfer 
status.  Like the “lag” regressions, these will basically follow equations (3) and 
(4): 
(12) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh +β3Transferi+β4AnticipateBBAi 
β5PilotDRGi+ β6(AnticipateBBAPilotTransfer)i + εih 
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(13) LOSih =β0 + β1Individuali + β2Hospitalh + β3Transfer + β4 DRGi + 
β5(AnticipateBBADRGiTransfer)i + ih 
Results are shown in Tables 3.19 and 3.20, respectively.  The results of 
equation (12) are consistent with other results in this paper.  Those patients 
transferred to post-acute care on or after 6/01/98 and categorized into a pilot 
DRG had lengths of stay that were, on average, .75 of a day shorter than other 
patients.  In equation 13, almost all of the DRG dummies had coefficients that 
were different, at least in magnitude, from those in the analogous “lag” regression 
and the original regression represented by equation (4), but there were no 
changes in signs.  These results seem to confirm my initial assertion that, since 
health care providers knew about the BBA provision a year in advance and knew 
its effective date, the incentive existed to change behavior when the provision 
went into effect, not after and not before.  
Analysis of “Shortstay” Patients 
Thus far, I have investigated the LOS for all patients.  However, the policy 
specifically targets those lengths of stay that are at least 1 day less than the 
geometric mean length of stay for that DRG in a fiscal year (which, for the federal 
government, begins October 1).  The dataset used in this study, thus far, 
contains information from four different fiscal years: 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.  
Therefore, each DRG will have four different geometric mean lengths of stay.  
The pilot and nonpilot DRGs are shown in Table 3.21, along with the 
corresponding length of stay.  
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A new dummy variable is generated, Shortstay, which equals one if the 
patient has a length of stay that is less than or equal to the geometric mean 
length of stay for that DRG in a given fiscal year.  The geometric mean length of 
stay for each DRG is based on the previous year’s lengths of stay and is 
published in the Federal Register sometime prior to the beginning of each fiscal 
year.  It makes sense to narrow the sample to observations that are less than 
their geometric mean length of stay, since the policy specifically targets those 
patients with particularly short hospital visits. 
The regression shown in equation 3 is rerun.  One regression is run with 
Pilotdrg=1 and then another one is run with Pilotdrg=0.  Both are also conditional 
on Shortstay=1.  Table 3.22 presents results, with differences.  Again, the 
primary variables of interest are the Transfer, Postbba and Postbbatransfer 
variables.  When PilotDRG=1, only the transfer variable has a significant 
coefficient.  In this regression, transfer patients experienced an increase in length 
of stay of nearly a day (.86) relative to non-transfer patients, over all time periods.  
Those patients discharged after 10/01/98, on average, experienced decreases of 
length of stay of about .06.  The interaction variable showed an average increase 
of .03 day for these patients, but was not significant by conventional measures.  
This result does not support the idea that, if acute care hospitals were simply 
exploiting a financial loophole with regards to transfer patients, behavior would 
change after 10/01/98. 
In the regression that is conditional on Pilotdrg=0, transfer patients 
grouped into the non-pilot DRGs stayed, on average, .50 of a day longer than 
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those patients not transferred to post-acute care.  Those patients discharged 
after 10/01/98 stayed an average of -.22 of a day less than those discharged 
before 10/01/98 and those transferred to post-acute care after 10/01/98 had LOS 
an average of .01 shorter than other patients. 
One can see that the differences between the two regressions are 
relatively small.  Only, the race variables have differences of at least half a day.  
The PostBBA variable shows a difference of only .16 between the two groups 
and the transfer variable shows a .36 difference.  Lastly, the PostBBATransfer 
variable represents a .05 difference between the treatment and control groups. 
Given these small differences, it would be a good idea to check to see if 
the coefficients are the same.  That is, if there is any difference between the 
patients grouped into the non-pilot and pilot DRGs.  The process used here is 
relatively simple.  It involves first interacting the Pilotdrg dummy variable with all 
of the independent variables included in the previously run regression.  Once 
these variables are generated, one regression is run which includes the non-
interacted variables and the interacted variables.  Results are in Table 3.23.  
Once the regression is performed, each of the interaction variable coefficients is 
tested to see if it equals zero.  For each, the null and alternative hypotheses are 
as follows: 
H0: βi=0 
HA: βi≠0 
βi is the coefficient on interaction variable i.  If the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, then the possibility exists that, for variable i, there is not a measurable 
 94
difference between the treatment group (the patients in the Pilotdrg category), 
and the control group (those in the Nonpilot category).  Test results are also in 
Table 3.23. 
Among the variables of interest, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for   
PostbbaPilot or PostbbapilotTransfer but can reject the null hypothesis for 
PilotDRGTransfer, implying that there may be some difference between patients 
grouped into pilot drgs and transferred and those patients that were not, but 
these differences might not have been affected by the changes in the Balanced 
Budget Act.   
Section VI 
 
This paper examines the implementation of the Post Acute Care transfer 
policy to determine the treatment effect on Medicare patients transferred to post 
acute care.  My analysis, thus far, shows that, on average, the implementation of 
the Post Acute Care Transfer Policy as set forth in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 did not result, on average, in significant increases in length of stay over all 
the “pilot” DRGs affected by this policy.    Based on this alone, one might 
conclude that, if shorter lengths of stay did exist for these patients prior to the 
implementation of the Balanced Budget Act provision, they were possibly the 
result of more efficient hospital treatment of patients, rather than exploitation of a 
financial loophole, contradicting the suspicions of the Healthcare Financing 
Administration (now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).   
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In order to determine if the policy had effects on hospital behavior 
reaching beyond what was intended, the regressions started off generally and 
became more specific.  All the regressions employed simple OLS.  The first 
regressions were the most general, aiming to look at the effects of the policy on 
all discharges in the dataset, regardless of DRG or time frame.  Additional 
regressions controlled for transfer status and the analysis continued, employing a 
semi-log model.  To round out the analysis, the issue of timing was addressed, 
the aim being to possibly get at behavior changes that do not occur at the BBA’s 
provision’s effective date.  The counterintuitive results in the early regressions 
are likely reflective of the fact that the equations were not specific enough given 
the intent of the bill.  While the variables of interest in these regressions were 
significant by conventional standards, the regressions did not yield the expected 
results.   
Clearly, the main thrust of this analysis is the examination of the “short 
stay” patients.  All other analyses point to the idea that this policy only affected 
the intended population.  These regressions yield the most interesting results.  In 
analyzing the shortstay patients, as shown in Table 3.22, the data show that 
patients that were grouped into the pilot DRGs and were transferred were in the 
hospital, on average, nearly a day (.87) longer than those who were not 
transferred, however, being transferred after 10/01/98 did not appear to make a 
significant difference on length of stay.  The final regression, in Table 3.23, 
performs tests to see whether there is any difference between the interacted 
variables and zero, with the results indicating that there may not be any 
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significant difference between the treatment (the Pilot diagnosis related groups) 
and control groups (the Non-pilot diagnosis related groups).  Therefore, it is 
possible, prior to the passage of the Balanced Budget Act, hospitals were not just 
exploiting a financial loophole, but may have been merely treating patients 
efficiently. 
The Implications of these Results and Fitting Them into the Big Picture of 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
 
As outlined in the introduction, the Medicare provisions of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 intended to modernize Medicare, expand benefits, and 
extend the life of the Medicare trust fund.  It is important to examine this 
legislation because the provisions present financial incentives to the healthcare 
industry that can alter how patients are treated.  The provision examined in this 
paper is based on the belief that healthcare providers were probably shifting care 
away from relatively more expensive inpatient settings to relatively less 
expensive post acute care settings.  Therefore, in enacting this legislation, the 
government has put in place an incentive for hospitals not to transfer patients 
“too early”, that is, transfer the patient to post acute at least 1 day less than the 
geometric mean length of stay.  The results of this analysis suggest that the 
Medicare provision may not have had the intended effect on hospital behavior. 
My results indicate an increase in length of stay for shortstay patients.  
However, the provision did not eliminate shortstay patients completely.  It is 
possible that the trends seen in healthcare were a partial result of a natural 
evolution of the healthcare industry and not purely a result of financial incentives.  
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Given that these results show that patients are being kept longer, it could be that 
patients are being kept long enough so that hospitals can receive the full DRG 
payment.  Therefore, it is possible that Medicare is not actually saving money but 
breaking even, when before they may have been subsidizing short stays.  The 
hospitals are now, if they are in fact keeping patients longer, incurring more in 
charges, the question being whether or not the DRG payment actually matches 
the costs the hospitals incur.  These patients are then transferred to post acute 
care, which is now (or will be) subject to prospective payment.  Future research 
will need to probe what the effect of this system has been on patients and post 
acute care. 
The previous two chapters discussed topics in health economics from 
distinct vantage points: the labor market, publicly provided health care and, to a 
lesser extent, industrial organization.  The concluding chapter presents some 
final thoughts 
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Table 3.2
Summary Statistics (N=717,784)
Variable Mean
Length of Stay 7.5423
Age 78.726
Female 0.6197
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG 1, Craniotomy, >17 Exc. Trauma 0.016
DRG 79, Respiratory Infection and Inflammation >17 w/CC 0.0823
DRG 106, Coronary Bypass w/PTCA 0.0074
DRG 107, Coronary Bypass w/Cardiac Cath 0.0438
DRG 148, Major Bowel Proc. w/CC 0.0694
DRG 239, Path Fractures, Musculoskeletal Connective Tissue Malignancy 0.0295
DRG 243, Medical Back Problems 0.0443
DRG 296, Nutrition and Misc. Metabolic Disorders, >17 w/CC 0.1139
DRG 415, Operating Room Procedure for Infect/Parasitic Disease 0.0166
DRG 468, Extensive Operating Room Procedure Unrelated to Principal Diagnosis 0.0254
Pilot DRGs
DRG 14, Specific Cerebrovascular Disorders Except Transient Ischemic Attack 0.1702
DRG 113, Amputation for Circulatory System Disorders Excluding Upper Limb and Toe 0.0188
DRG 209, Major Joint Limb Reattachment Procedures of Lower Extremity 0.1927
DRG 210, Hip and Femur Procedures Except Major Joint Age>17 with CC 0.0711
DRG 211, Hip and Femur Procedures Except Major Joint Age>17 without CC 0.0172
DRG 236, Fractures of Hip and Pelvis 0.0284
DRG 263, Skin Graft and/or Debridement for Skin Ulcer or Cellulitis with CC 0.0102
DRG 264, Skin Graft and/or Debridement for Skin Ulcer or Cellulitis without CC 0.0016
DRG 429, Organic Disturbances and Mental Retardation 0.0276
DRG 483, Tracheostomy Except for Face, Mouth and Neck Diagnosis 0.0136
Race
White 0.8578
Black 0.0705
Hispanic 0.0436
Asian 0.0131
Native American 0.0013
Other Race 0.0136
Hospital Size
Small 0.1304
Medium 0.2686
Large 0.601
Hospital Region
Northeast 0.1839
Midwest 0.1837
South 0.4256
West 0.2069
Hospital Control
Government/Private Collapsed 0.4946
Government, nonfederal 0.0784
Private, nonprofit 0.2389
Private, investor owned 0.1341
Private, collapsed 0.054
Dummy Variables
Post BBA 0.8627
PilotDRG 0.5514
Transfer 0.6937
Note: Some of the variables here are further defined and described 
in Tables III and IV.
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Table 3.4
Bed Size Categories, By Region
(Source: HCUP)
Location and Teaching Status Hospital Bed Size
Small Medium Large
Northeast
Rural <49 50-99 100+
Urban, Non-Teaching <124 125-199 200+
Urban, Teaching <249 250-424 425+
Midwest
Rural <29 30-49 50+
Urban, Non-Teaching <74 75-174 175+
Urban, Teaching <249 250-374 375+
South
Rural <39 40-74 75+
Urban, Non-Teaching <99 100-199 200+
Urban, Teaching <249 250-449 450+
West
Rural <24 25-44 45+
Urban, Non-Teaching <99 100-174 175+
Urban, Teaching <199 200-324 325+
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Table 3.5
Regression Results, Equation 1
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant=9.63093
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value
Age -0.002609 0.0012453 -2.09
Female -0.605022 0.0198729 -30.44
Black 1.619981 0.0377558 42.91
Hispanic 0.9724109 0.047244 20.58
Asian 1.900013 0.0852679 22.28
Native American 0.9239064 0.2602649 3.55
Other Race 0.7249161 0.0822647 8.81
Small Hospital -0.454286 0.0322668 -14.08
Large Hospital 0.6356079 0.0223306 28.46
Rural -0.769309 0.0340724 -22.58
Urban Teaching 0.7576919 0.0339298 22.33
Midwest -1.759315 0.0339092 -51.88
South -1.607219 0.0362892 -44.29
West -1.807021 0.0395302 -45.71
Gov't  or Private -0.166711 0.0469979 -3.55
Gov't Nonfederal -0.21053 0.0443726 -4.74
Private Nonprofit -0.130295 0.0329554 -3.95
Private Other -0.29352 0.063085 -4.65
PostBBA 0.0605915 0.0417786 1.45
PilotDRG -1.509794 0.0515573 -29.28
PostBBAPilot 0.3017544 0.0554799 5.44
N=717784
F=897.79
R2=.0256
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Table 3.6
Regression Results, Equation 2
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant:4.670573
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0274058 0.0011015 24.88
Female 0.0274427 0.0171368 1.6
Black 1.008862 0.0324071 31.13
Asian 1.382297 0.0724577 19.08
Hispanic 0.6435091 0.0401654 16.02
Native American 0.9576045 0.2208734 4.34
Other Race 0.3949922 0.069832 5.66
Small Hospital -0.2380487 0.0274013 -8.69
Large Hospital 0.3900299 0.0189963 20.53
Rural -0.3398719 0.0290145 -11.71
Urban Teaching 0.3508052 0.0288443 12.16
Midwest -1.455391 0.0288182 -50.5
South -1.397508 0.0308196 -45.34
West -1.478717 0.0335907 -44.02
Gov't, private collapsed 0.0233699 0.0398976 0.59
Gov't, nonfederal -0.0560313 0.03768 -1.49
Private, Nonprofit -0.0155078 0.027988 -0.55
Private, Other -0.1805167 0.0535645 -3.37
PostBBA 0.2037237 0.0540489 3.77
Pilot DRGs
DRG113 3.912666 0.1778814 22
DRG209 -1.019596 0.0706586 -14.43
DRG210 -0.0616486 0.0955222 -0.65
DRG211 -1.578132 0.192224 -8.21
DRG236 1.655157 0.1325738 12.48
DRG263 2.892087 0.2127469 13.59
DRG264 -0.2543868 0.5880265 -0.43
DRG429 2.644486 0.1538178 17.19
DRG483 25.59634 0.1921556 133.21
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG79 2.788888 0.0876534 31.82
DRG106 4.091661 0.116063 35.25
DRG107 1.923218 0.1445416 13.31
DRG148 5.266046 0.0962156 54.73
DRG239 0.266293 0.1368622 1.95
DRG243 -0.9587485 0.1191991 -8.04
DRG296 -1.169694 0.0854375 -13.69
DRG415 6.335922 0.1717608 36.89
DRG468 5.865768 0.1546063 37.94
Pilot DRGs
PostBBADRG113 0.9081011 0.1895932 4.79
PostBBADRG209 -0.1786538 0.0760133 -2.35
PostBBADRG210 0.2787561 0.1027703 2.71
PostBBADRG211 0.0424596 0.2039435 0.21
PosBBADRG236 -1.202728 0.1436888 -8.37
PostBBADRG263 1.857765 0.2306072 8.06
PostBBADRG264 0.4887206 0.626852 0.78
PostBBADRG429 0.0910564 0.16345 0.56
PostBBADRG483 7.609885 0.2070036 36.76
Non-Pilot DRGs
PostBBADRG79 -0.288339 0.0949212 -3.04
PostBBADRG106 1.042929 0.2438357 4.28
POstBBADRG107 2.074568 0.1511231 13.73
PostBBADRG148 0.063955 0.1036566 0.62
PostBBADRG239 -0.3207216 0.1472451 -2.18
PostBBADRG243 -0.3065246 0.1276163 -2.4
PostBBADRG296 0.1273197 0.0913702 1.39
PostBBADRG415 0.9006424 0.1856704 4.85
PostBBADRG468 0.200403 0.1649611 1.21
N=717784
F=5549.81
R2=.2984
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Table 3.7
Regression Results, Equation 3 
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 9.571806
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age -0.0286828 0.0012566 -22.83
Female -0.696178 0.0197299 -35.29
Black 1.598881 0.0374394 42.71
Asian 1.982839 0.0845421 23.45
Hispanic 1.075905 0.046849 22.97
Native American 1.040552 0.2580473 4.03
Other Race 0.7045837 0.0815627 8.64
Small Hospital -0.4386129 0.0319919 -13.71
Large Hospital 0.6458664 0.0221407 29.17
Rural -0.6681979 0.0337952 25.11
Urban Teaching 0.844925 0.0336502 25.11
Midwest -1.654639 0.0336316 -49.2
South -1.443199 0.0360107 -40.08
West -1.692578 0.0392072 -43.17
Gov't, private collapsed -0.0425233 0.0466107 -0.91
Gov't, nonfederal -0.1008894 0.0440058 -2.29
Private, Nonprofit 0.0126322 0.0326999 0.39
Private, Other -0.1860314 0.0625542 -2.97
Transfer 2.625022 0.0259134 101.3
PostBBA 0.5005109 0.0326395 15.33
PilotDRG -1.381747 0.0294256 -46.96
PostBBAPilotTransfer -0.6337176 0.0367294 -17.25
N=717784
F=1435.60
R2=.0421
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Table 3.8
Regression Results, Equation 4
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 4.6382
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0056478 0.0011084 5.1
Female -0.0510835 0.0169772 -3.01
Black 0.947559 0.0320615 29.55
Asian 1.453919 0.0716691 20.29
Hispanic 0.7132778 0.0397324 17.95
Native American 0.9905633 0.2184727 4.53
Othrace 0.3558759 0.0690651 5.15
Small Hospital -0.2277191 0.0271033 -8.4
Large Hospital 0.4076875 0.0187891 21.7
Rural -0.263672 0.0287082 -9.18
Urban Teaching 0.4446047 0.0285387 15.58
Midwest -1.372438 0.0285274 -48.11
South -1.24469 0.030515 -40.79
West -1.370544 0.0332402 -41.23
Gov't, private collapsed 0.1174144 0.0394751 2.97
Gov't, nonfederal 0.0254534 0.0372751 0.68
Private, Nonprofit 0.1042331 0.0277042 3.76
Private, Other -0.0998334 0.0529882 -1.88
PostBBA 0.4976645 0.0314631 15.82
Transfer 1.893239 0.0303774 62.32
Pilot DRG's
DRG113 4.694134 0.1236498 37.96
DRG209 -0.5892604 0.0423285 -13.92
DRG210 0.4251968 0.0713948 5.96
DRG211 -1.041212 0.1316436 -7.91
DRG236 1.904685 0.0931235 20.45
DRG263 3.790782 0.1352686 28.02
DRG264 0.6949265 0.2919624 2.38
DRG429 3.393345 0.0809169 41.94
DRG483 27.54741 0.1489541 184.94
Non-Pilot DRG's 
DRG79 2.802233 0.0519341 53.96
DRG106 4.561893 0.1033341 44.15
DRG107 3.59825 0.0581257 61.9
DRG148 4.692819 0.0474004 99
DRG239 0.4037091 0.0759466 5.32
DRG243 -0.7588262 0.0580798 -13.07
DRG296 -0.7573248 0.0416193 -18.2
DRG415 5.789864 0.0996072 58.13
DRG468 4.275523 0.0754302 56.68
Pilot DRG's
PostBBADRG113Transfer -0.4681994 0.1408478 -3.32
PostBBADRG209Transfer -1.252154 0.0493642 -25.37
PostBBADRG210Transfer -0.7490645 0.0796281 -9.41
PostBBADRG211Transfer -1.013866 0.1491961 -6.8
PostBBADRG236Transfer -2.030391 0.1092773 -18.58
PostBBADRG263Transfer 0.8803581 0.1679575 5.24
PostBBADRG264Transfer -0.7055762 0.4029418 -1.75
PostBBADRG429Transfer -0.9886789 0.102818 -9.62
PostBBADRG483Transfer 5.235777 0.1681443 31.14
Non-Pilot DRG's 
PostBBADRG79Transfer -0.4773 0.0644889 -7.4
PostBBADRG106Transfer 1.233088 0.3179762 3.88
PostBBADRG107Transfer 0.967768 0.0825167 11.73
PostBBADRG148Transfer 2.416556 0.0689371 35.05
PostBBADRG239Transfer -0.6045363 0.0985856 -6.13
PostBBADRG243Transfer -0.3427165 0.0818985 -4.18
PostBBADRG296Transfer 0.0799059 0.0564352 1.42
PostBBADRG415Transfer 2.156454 0.1291585 16.7
PostBBADRG468Transfer 3.894762 0.1045448 37.25
N=717784
F=5854.47
R2=.3136
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Table 3.9
Regression Results, Equation 1
Conditional on Transfer=1
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 13.91939
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value
Age -0.0446298 0.0016168 -27.6
Female -0.9331988 0.0261171 -35.73
Black 1.676303 0.0494526 33.9
Hispanic 1.214172 0.0636001 19.09
Asian 2.424588 0.1142992 21.21
Native American 1.36872 0.359561 3.81
Other Race 0.6553724 0.105789 6.2
Small Hospital -0.53957 0.0415079 -13
Large Hospital 0.7432093 0.0288129 25.79
Rural -0.8624509 0.044675 -19.31
Urban Teaching 0.8981306 0.0431426 20.82
Midwest -1.630277 0.043403 -37.56
South -1.460997 0.0472484 -30.92
West -1.662932 0.0511087 -32.54
Gov't Private -0.0092453 0.0600612 -0.15
Gov't Nonfederal -0.1909527 0.0570484 -3.35
Private Nonprofit -0.0287663 0.042022 -0.68
Private Other -0.1569847 0.0818719 -1.92
PostBBA 0.231552 0.0596205 3.88
PilotDRG -2.278573 0.0688984 -33.07
PostBBAPilot 0.1886523 0.0741294 2.54
Note: N=497947
F=922.10
R2=.0374
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Table 3.10
Regression Results, Equation 2
Conditional on Transfer=1
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 7.788709
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age -0.0070023 0.0014116 -4.96
Female -0.190142 0.0221927 -8.57
Black 0.7474812 0.0418891 17.84
Asian 1.65258 0.0957511 17.26
Hispanic 0.6652514 0.0533023 12.48
Native American 1.12837 0.3007609 3.75
Othrace 0.2881761 0.0885139 3.26
Small Hospital -0.2921802 0.0347408 -8.41
Large Hospital 0.4933987 0.0241501 20.43
Rural -0.4004358 0.0374849 -10.68
Urban Teaching 0.4668921 0.0361366 12.92
Midwest -1.336231 0.0363457 -36.76
South -1.208308 0.0395527 -30.55
West -1.315758 0.0428185 -30.73
Gov't, private collapsed 0.2148014 0.050252 4.27
Gov't, nonfederal 0.035483 0.0477501 0.74
Private, Nonprofit 0.1412994 0.0351758 4.02
Private, Other -0.0256455 0.0685168 -0.37
PostBBA 0.3392433 0.0693851 4.89
Pilot DRGs
DRG113 3.338942 0.2063412 16.18
DRG209 -1.675217 0.0869936 -19.26
DRG210 -0.5342174 0.1007303 -4.82
DRG211 -2.048011 0.2218451 -9.23
DRG236 0.9955728 0.1570029 6.34
DRG263 2.42335 0.2616549 9.26
DRG264 -0.4821428 0.7764619 -0.62
DRG429 2.480821 0.2032955 12.2
DRG483 24.98695 0.2159863 115.69
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG79 2.67785 0.1110909 24.11
DRG106 4.379412 0.1695066 25.84
DRG107 1.852129 0.2139495 8.66
DRG148 6.695817 0.142232 47.08
DRG239 -0.0832764 0.1749304 -0.48
DRG243 -0.8173748 0.1697635 -4.81
DRG296 -0.8594929 0.1212308 -7.09
DRG415 6.90365 0.2253206 30.64
DRG468 7.575617 0.2159676 35.08
Pilot DRGs
PostBBADRG113 0.7627947 0.2197285 3.47
PostBBADRG209 -0.3091462 0.0935312 -3.31
PostBBADRG210 0.1544608 0.1191289 1.3
PostBBADRG211 -0.0755374 0.2352806 -0.32
PosBBADRG236 -1.165053 0.1699075 -6.86
PostBBADRG263 2.170862 0.2833904 7.66
PostBBADRG264 0.3940168 0.8320058 0.47
PostBBADRG429 -0.1565688 0.2153634 -0.73
PostBBADRG483 7.591349 0.2327098 32.62
Non-Pilot DRGs
PostBBADRG79 -0.440605 0.1201286 -3.67
PostBBADRG106 1.156171 0.3650431 3.17
PostBBADRG107 2.45435 0.2237604 10.97
PostBBADRG148 0.2929886 0.1532636 1.91
PostBBADRG239 -0.1987291 0.1885784 -1.05
PostBBADRG243 -0.3569031 0.181778 -1.96
PostBBADRG296 0.124247 0.1294246 0.96
PostBBADRG415 0.8822364 0.2427892 3.63
PostBBADRG468 0.4634483 0.2303792 2.01
Note: N=497947
F=4391.32
R2=.3266
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Table 3.11
Regression Results, Equation 5
Dependent Variable: Log Length of Stay
Constant: 1.755033
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value
Age 0.0023925 0.0001101 21.73
Female -0.0554111 0.0017566 -31.54
Black 0.1355975 0.0033374 40.63
Hispanic 0.1003714 0.0041761 24.03
Asian 0.1592454 0.0075371 21.13
Native American 0.0529566 0.0230056 2.3
Other Race 0.0814954 0.0072716 11.21
Small Hospital -0.0562017 0.0028522 -19.7
Large Hospital 0.0627062 0.0019739 31.77
Rural -0.0690899 0.0030118 -22.94
Urban Teaching 0.0598092 0.0029992 19.94
Midwest -0.1452125 0.0029973 -48.45
South -0.1285352 0.0032077 -40.07
West -0.1946779 0.0034942 -55.71
Gov't Private -0.0040401 0.0041543 -0.97
Gov't Nonfederal -0.0301669 0.0039222 -7.69
Private Nonprofit -0.0058127 0.002913 -2
Private Other -0.0356488 0.0055763 -6.39
PostBBA -0.0137706 0.0036929 -3.73
PilotDRG -0.21776 0.0045573 -47.78
PostBBAPilot 0.0481504 0.004904 9.82
Note: N=717784
F=1309.42
R2=.0369
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Table 3.13
Regression Results, Equation 6
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 9.614609
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value
Age -0.0025787 0.0012453 -2.07
Female -0.6054552 0.0198721 -30.47
Black 1.612596 0.0377734 42.69
Hispanic 0.9780725 0.0472548 20.7
Asian 1.896992 0.0852656 22.25
Native American 0.919577 0.2602579 3.53
Other Race 0.7220149 0.0822628 8.78
Small Hospital -0.4526784 0.0322667 -14.03
Large Hospital 0.6363455 0.0223301 28.5
Rural -0.7750284 0.0340845 -22.74
Urban Teaching 0.7606627 0.0339311 22.42
Midwest -1.757739 0.0339099 -51.84
South -1.595462 0.0363412 -43.9
West -1.784741 0.0396941 -44.96
Gov't Private -0.1811208 0.0470494 -3.85
Gov't Nonfederal -0.2144744 0.0443751 -4.83
Private Nonprofit -0.1381547 0.0329805 -4.19
Private Other -0.3001889 0.0630902 -4.76
LagPostBBA 0.080306 0.0378553 2.12
PilotDRG -1.516681 0.0449758 -33.72
LagPostBBAPilot 0.3271115 0.0496496 6.59
N=717784
F=897.79
R2=.0256
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Table 3.14
Regression Results, Equation 7
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 4.640194
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0275085 0.0011011 24.98
Female 0.0278989 0.0171304 1.63
Black 0.9980213 0.0324119 30.79
Asian 1.383373 0.0724337 19.1
Hispanic 0.6546233 0.0401662 16.3
Native American 0.9509022 0.2207926 4.31
Othrace 0.383486 0.0698035 5.49
Small Hospital -0.2371612 0.0273924 -8.66
Large Hospital 0.3889129 0.0189891 20.48
Rural -0.3445757 0.0290152 -11.88
Urban Teaching 0.3494827 0.0288375 12.12
Midwest -1.448816 0.0288105 -50.29
South -1.378299 0.0308551 -44.67
West -1.448972 0.0337197 -42.97
Gov't, private collapsed 0.0102889 0.0399288 0.26
Gov't, nonfederal -0.0650537 0.037668 -1.73
Private, Nonprofit -0.0286734 0.0280008 -1.02
Private, Other -0.1883194 0.0535504 -3.52
LagPostBBA 0.2385402 0.0483575 4.93
Pilot DRGs
DRG113 3.940521 0.1562081 25.23
DRG209 -0.9875618 0.0612641 -16.12
DRG210 -0.0580834 0.0823265 -0.71
DRG211 -1.571264 0.1643744 -9.56
DRG236 1.630359 0.114224 14.27
DRG263 3.247462 0.1856075 17.5
DRG264 -0.3035004 0.5166668 -0.59
DRG429 2.588013 0.1335498 19.38
DRG483 25.6255 0.1686673 151.93
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG79 2.781333 0.0766846 36.27
DRG106 4.098889 0.1127259 36.36
DRG107 2.685633 0.117349 22.89
DRG148 5.22286 0.0834719 62.57
DRG239 0.1892371 0.119436 1.58
DRG243 -0.9571425 0.1033943 -9.26
DRG296 -1.145634 0.0743624 -15.41
DRG415 6.405126 0.1493821 42.88
DRG468 5.755037 0.1339857 42.95
Pilot DRGs
LagPostBBADRG113 0.9111351 0.1699627 5.36
LagPostBBADRG209 -0.2271363 0.0676985 -3.36
LagPostBBADRG210 0.2916912 0.0911143 3.2
LagPostBBADRG211 0.0335158 0.1785629 0.19
LagPostBBADRG236 -1.252198 0.1277598 -9.8
LagPostBBADRG263 1.524669 0.2069439 7.37
LagPostBBADRG264 0.5655171 0.562189 1.01
LagPostBBADRG429 0.160499 0.1449974 1.11
LagPostBBADRG483 7.953302 0.1862003 42.71
Non-Pilot DRGs
LagPostBBADRG79 -0.296264 0.0853312 -3.47
LagPostBBADRG106 1.111997 0.2477348 4.49
LagPostBBADRG107 1.307672 0.1258077 10.39
LagPostBBADRG148 0.1218906 0.0923968 1.32
LagPostBBADRG239 -0.243335 0.1317833 -1.85
LagPostBBADRG243 -0.3249961 0.1134575 -2.86
LagPostBBADRG296 0.1020962 0.0814252 1.25
LagPostBBADRG415 0.8685464 0.1660411 5.23
LagPostBBADRG468 0.3407232 0.1463508 2.33
N=717784
F=5563.80
R2=.2989
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Table 3.15
Regression Results, Equation 8
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 9.61448
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age -0.028566 0.0012566 -22.73
Female -0.6987361 0.0197294 -35.42
Black 1.592805 0.0374588 42.52
Asian 1.980467 0.0845453 23.42
Hispanic 1.08464 0.0468631 23.14
Native American 1.980467 0.0845453 23.42
Othrace 0.7020634 0.0815661 8.61
Small Hospital -0.4360464 0.0319938 -13.63
Large Hospital 0.6461167 0.0221415 29.18
Rural -0.674657 0.0338092 -19.95
Urban Teaching 0.8472488 0.0336537 25.18
Midwest -1.652254 0.0336344 -49.12
South -1.430724 0.0360651 -39.67
West -1.668406 0.0393731 -42.37
Gov't, private collapsed -0.057341 0.0466658 -1.23
Gov't, nonfederal -0.1041822 0.0440123 -2.37
Private, Nonprofit 0.0037866 0.0327265 0.12
Private, Other -0.1918539 0.0625635 -3.07
Transfer 2.571912 0.0253326 101.53
PilotDRG -1.46377 0.0282046 -51.9
LagPostBBA 0.5003743 0.0302868 16.52
LagPostBBAPilotTransfer -0.5219241 0.03576 -14.6
N=717784
F=1433.80
R2=.0421
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Table 3.16
Regression Results, Equation 9
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 4.689926
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0057916 0.0011082 5.23
Female -0.0517231 0.0169742 -3.05
Black 0.9378227 0.0320721 29.24
Asian 1.45239 0.0716599 20.27
Hispanic 0.7286519 0.0397405 18.34
Native American 0.983359 0.2184422 5.09
Othrace 0.3513093 0.0690561 5.09
Small Hospital -0.2256348 0.0271004 -8.33
Large Hospital 0.4065664 0.0187866 21.64
Rural -0.2694056 0.0287148 -9.38
Urban Teaching 0.443741 0.028537 15.55
Midwest -1.364612 0.0285219 -47.84
South -1.224249 0.030557 -40.06
West -1.339346 0.0333746 -40.13
Gov't, private collapsed 0.1029228 0.0395169 2.6
Gov't, nonfederal 0.0182419 0.0372752 0.49
Private, Nonprofit 0.0908605 0.0277226 3.28
Private, Other -0.1059475 0.052987 -2
LagPostBBA 0.4679063 0.0291071 16.08
Transfer 1.864351 0.0288034 64.73
Pilot DRGs
DRG 113 4.51021 0.1159946 38.88
DRG 209 -0.6982915 0.0400169 -17.45
DRG 210 0.2394052 0.0649701 3.68
DRG 211 -1.183822 0.1222942 -9.68
DRG 236 1.764267 0.0865483 20.38
DRG 263 3.800832 0.1285216 29.57
DRG 264 0.6611635 0.2866109 2.31
DRG 429 3.303585 0.0783737 42.15
DRG 483 27.30591 0.1375955 198.45
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG 79 2.766233 0.0497238 55.63
DRG106 4.503837 0.1022837 44.03
DRG 107 3.61644 0.0566431 63.85
DRG 148 4.744954 0.0462196 102.66
DRG 239 0.3422787 0.0733031 4.67
DRG 243 -0.7819488 0.0566013 -13.82
DRG 296 -0.7798461 0.0404699 -19.27
DRG 415 5.90288 0.095746 61.65
DRG 468 4.370348 0.0735041 59.46
Pilot DRGs
LagPostBBADRG113Tran -0.2350692 0.1347507 -1.74
LagPostBBADRG209Tran -1.152942 0.047334 -24.36
LagPostBBADRG210Tran -0.5364348 0.0741898 -7.23
LagPostBBADRG211Tran -0.8651171 0.1417 -6.11
LagPostBBADRG236Tran -1.951327 0.1045986 -18.66
LagPostBBADRG263Tran 0.9231168 0.1643249 5.62
LagPostBBADRG264Tran -0.6734182 0.4023649 -1.67
LagPostBBADRG429Tran -0.8774208 0.1014522 -8.65
LagPostBBADRG483Tran 5.832019 0.1590267 36.67
Non-Pilot DRGs
LagPostBBADRG79Tran -0.4442843 0.0630311 -7.05
LagPostBBADRG106Tran 1.4058 0.3248249 4.33
LagPostBBADRG107Tran 0.9735616 0.0824187 11.81
LagPostBBADRG148Tran 2.403198 0.0688483 34.91
LagPostBBADRG239Tran -0.5259725 0.0974279 -5.4
LagPostBBADRG243Tran -0.3204367 0.0816523 -3.92
LagPostBBADRG296Tran 0.1181538 0.0558031 2.12
LagPostBBADRG415Tran 2.083898 0.1276101 16.33
LagPostBBADRG468Tran 3.878949 0.1041914 37.23
N=717784
F=5859.92
R2 =.3138
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Table 3.17
Regression Results, Equation 10
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 9.73182
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value
Age -0.0026247 0.0012453 -2.11
Female -0.6042289 0.0198734 -30.4
Black 1.626958 0.0377462 43.1
Hispanic 0.9650583 0.0472322 20.43
Asian 1.902775 0.0852695 22.31
Native American 0.9270419 0.260273 3.56
Other Race 0.7269395 0.0822666 8.84
Small Hospital -0.4566191 0.0322662 -14.15
Large Hospital 0.634724 0.022331 28.42
Rural -0.7630442 0.0340644 -22.4
Urban Teaching 0.7545686 0.0339279 22.24
Midwest -1.761821 0.0339079 -51.96
South -1.619924 0.0362499 -44.69
West -1.83127 0.0393851 -46.5
Gov't Private -0.1521105 0.0469598 -3.24
Gov't Nonfederal -0.2063697 0.0443706 -4.65
Private Nonprofit -0.122085 0.0329381 -3.71
Private Other -0.2869482 0.0630802 -4.55
AnticipateBBA -0.0512633 0.0484993 -1.06
PilotDRG -1.57185 0.0617432 -25.46
AnticipateBBAPilot 0.3568695 0.0649051 5.5
N=717784
F=895.72
R2=.0255
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Table 3.18
Regression Results, Equation 11
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant:4.501991
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0273469 0.0011022 24.81
Female 0.0280523 0.0171466 1.64
Black 1.019012 0.0324162 31.44
Asian 1.383815 0.0724952 19.09
Hispanic 0.6308688 0.0401738 15.7
Native American 0.9420835 0.2209991 4.26
Othrace 0.3952344 0.0698701 5.66
Small Hospital -0.2399825 0.0274155 -8.75
Large Hospital 0.3906578 0.0190063 20.55
Rural -0.3339005 0.0290236 -11.5
Urban Teaching 0.3534936 0.0288566 12.25
Midwest -1.462777 0.0288316 -50.74
South -1.420672 0.0308019 -46.12
West -1.514396 0.0334877 -45.22
Gov't, private collapsed 0.032989 0.0398852 0.83
Gov't, nonfederal -0.0536863 0.0376965 -1.42
Private, Nonprofit -0.0050953 0.0279884 -0.18
Private, Other -0.177126 0.0535888 -3.31
Pilot DRGs
DRG113 4.178221 0.2145716 19.47
DRG209 -1.050751 0.0846193 -12.42
DRG210 -0.0475344 0.115202 -0.41
DRG211 -1.552286 0.2325049 -6.68
DRG236 1.642492 0.1597568 10.28
DRG263 2.516048 0.256258 9.82
DRG264 -0.2510643 0.7396343 -0.34
DRG429 2.445903 0.1842981 13.27
DRG483 25.96434 0.2290754 113.34
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG79 2.765118 0.1031145 26.82
DRG106 4.163938 0.1381512 30.14
DRG107 1.849106 0.1721306 10.74
DRG148 5.300348 0.1155932 45.85
DRG239 0.4523446 0.1641553 2.76
DRG243 -1.006137 0.1433131 -7.02
DRG296 -1.148463 0.1038141 -11.06
DRG415 6.354393 0.2074869 30.63
DRG468 5.962151 0.184975 32.23
AnticipateBBA 0.1472438 0.0631388 2.33
Pilot DRGs
AnticipateBBADRG113 0.5821544 0.2239905 2.6
AnticipateBBADRG209 -0.1365893 0.0889324 -1.54
AnticipateBBADRG210 0.249261 0.1209996 2.06
AnticipateBBADRG211 0.0156591 0.2419232 0.06
AnticipateBBADRG236 -1.124167 0.1686177 -6.67
AnticipateBBADRG263 2.178837 0.2705235 8.05
AnticipateBBADRG264 0.4605466 0.769431 0.6
AnticipateBBADRG429 0.3025502 0.1921173 1.57
AnticipateBBADRG483 6.856398 0.2411198 28.44
Non-Pilot DRGs
AnticipateBBADRG79 -0.2476787 0.1090892 -2.27
AnticipateBBADRG106 0.1650902 0.2000136 0.83
AnticipateBBADRG107 2.105493 0.1775221 11.86
AnticipateBBADRG148 0.0213978 0.1215738 0.18
AnticipateBBADRG239 -0.5129337 0.17252 -2.97
AnticipateBBADRG243 -0.2410397 0.1500922 -1.61
AnticipateBBADRG296 0.0994189 0.1085405 0.92
AnticipateBBADRG415 0.8324467 0.2185771 3.81
AnticipateBBADRG468 0.0877136 0.1933781 0.45
N=717784
F=5528.60
R2=.2976
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Table 3.19
Regression Results, Equation 12
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 9.55283
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age -0.0287726 0.0012565 -22.9
Female -0.6931173 0.0197301 -35.13
Black 1.604052 0.0374278 42.86
Asian 1.984536 0.0845378 23.48
Hispanic 1.066696 0.0468336 22.78
Native American 1.043087 0.2580377 4.04
Othrace 0.7068489 0.0815588 8.67
Small Hospital -0.4407686 0.0319892 -13.78
Large Hospital 0.6456676 0.0221396 29.16
Rural -0.6618132 0.033785 -19.59
Urban Teaching 0.8423295 0.033646 25.04
Midwest -1.657532 0.033628 -49.29
South -1.455431 0.0359689 -40.46
West -1.716837 0.03906 -43.95
Gov't, private collapsed -0.0289913 0.0465689 -0.62
Gov't, nonfederal -0.0985595 0.0439998 -2.24
Private, Nonprofit 0.0204726 0.0326805 0.63
Private, Other -0.1808736 0.0625449 -2.89
Transfer 2.687512 0.0265892 101.08
AnticipateBBA 0.4668635 0.0367398 12.71
PilotDRG -1.285244 0.0308221 -41.7
AnticipateBBAPilotTransfer -0.757911 0.0379717 -19.96
N=717784
F=1438.26
R2=.0422
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Table 3.20
Regression Results, Equation 13
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay
Constant: 4.588654
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-Value
Age 0.0054819 0.0011087 4.94
Female -0.0501721 0.0169822 -2.95
Black 0.9577767 0.032061 29.87
Asian 1.456301 0.0716855 20.32
Hispanic 0.7005267 0.0397291 17.63
Native American 0.9852397 0.2185276 4.51
Othrace 0.3578987 0.0690812 5.18
Small Hospital -0.2306307 0.0271089 -8.51
Large Hospital 0.4086962 0.0187934 21.75
Rural -0.2571079 0.0287087 -8.96
Urban Teaching 0.4435332 0.0285431 15.54
Midwest -1.379444 0.0285365 -48.34
South -1.266695 0.0304886 -41.55
West -1.405585 0.0331301 -42.43
Gov't, private collapsed 0.1321539 0.0394499 3.35
Gov't, nonfederal 0.0298989 0.03728 0.8
Private, Nonprofit 0.1144622 0.0276962 4.13
Private, Other -0.0964906 0.0529956 -1.82
AnticipateBBA 0.5005927 0.0350819 14.27
Transfer 1.959608 0.0323323 60.61
Pilot DRGs
DRG 113 5.011057 0.1329439 37.69
DRG 209 -0.4522222 0.0449972 -10.05
DRG 210 0.6615885 0.0791664 8.36
DRG 211 -0.8668984 0.1414605 -6.13
DRG 236 2.074409 0.1003959 20.66
DRG 263 3.870951 0.142395 27.18
DRG 264 0.8417361 0.3020502 2.79
DRG 429 3.473088 0.0835828 41.55
DRG 483 28.2672 0.1635485 172.84
Non-Pilot DRGs
DRG79 2.838557 0.0543394 52.24
DRG 106 4.530134 0.1098165 41.25
DRG 107 3.673871 0.0592497 62.01
DRG 148 4.666528 0.048742 95.74
DRG 239 0.4904026 0.0788239 6.22
DRG 243 -0.7249462 0.059642 -12.15
DRG 296 -0.7113796 0.0429895 -16.55
DRG 415 5.739618 0.1034411 55.49
DRG 468 4.179264 0.0773575 54.03
Pilot DRGs
AnticipateBBADRG113Tran -0.860659 0.1486551 -5.79
AnticipateBBADRG209Tran -1.391769 0.0519429 -26.79
AnticipateBBADRG210Tran -1.015026 0.0866211 -11.72
AnticipateBBADRG211Tran -1.203076 0.1575297 -7.64
AnticipateBBADRG236Tran -2.161365 0.115032 -18.79
AnticipateBBADRG263Tran 0.7068817 0.1724675 4.1
AnticipateBBADRG264Tran -0.9264337 0.4051676 -2.29
AnticipateBBADRG429Tran -1.078106 0.1045096 -10.32
AnticipateBBADRG483Tran 4.101564 0.180587 22.71
Non-Pilot DRGs
AnticipateBBADRG79Tran -0.5118546 0.066376 -7.71
AnticipateBBADRG106Tran 0.359401 0.2322647 1.55
AnticipateBBADRG107Tran 0.8217474 0.0831027 9.89
AnticipateBBADRG148Tran 2.390839 0.0693938 34.45
AnticipateBBADRG239Tran -0.7199296 0.1001874 -7.19
AnticipateBBADRG243Tran -0.3749561 0.082482 -4.55
AnticipateBBADRG296Tran 0.0045345 0.0573788 0.08
AnticipateBBADRG415Tran 2.131692 0.1311388 16.26
AnticipateBBADRG468Tran 3.942784 0.1052317 37.47
N=717784
F=5845.21
R2 =.3132
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Table 3.21
Geometric Mean Length of Stays, by DRG
Non-Pilot DRGs Pilot DRGs
DRG FY GLOS-1 DRG FY GLOS-1
1 1998 6.2 14 1998 4.1
1999 5.8 1999 3.9
2000 5.5 2000 3.7
2001 5.3 2001 3.7
79 1998 5.8 113 1998 8.7
1999 5.7 1999 8.8
2000 6.8 2000 8.5
2001 5.6 2001 8.8
106 1998 8.8 209 1998 4.3
1999 8.1 1999 3.9
2000 8.1 2000 3.6
2001 8.3 2001 3.6
107 1998 6.3 210 1998 5.5
1999 8.5 1999 5.1
2000 7.3 2000 4.9
2001 8.2 2001 5
148 1998 9.6 211 1998 4
1999 9.3 1999 3.7
2000 9.1 2000 3.5
2001 9.1 2001 3.5
239 1998 4.3 236 1998 3.3
1999 4 1999 3.1
2000 3.9 2000 2.9
2001 3.9 2001 3
243 1998 3 263 1998 7.9
1999 2.8 1999 7.8
2000 2.7 2000 7.7
2001 2.7 2001 7.9
296 1998 3.3 264 1998 4.4
1999 3.1 1999 4.4
2000 3 2000 4.3
2001 3 2001 4.4
415 1998 9.8 429 1998 4.4
1999 9.5 1999 4.2
2000 9.3 2000 3.9
2001 9.4 2001 3.9
468 1998 8.9 483 1998 32.8
1999 8.5 1999 33
2000 3.7 2000 32
2001 8.2 2001 32.7
119
Ta
bl
e 
3.
22
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
, E
qu
at
io
n 
3
C
on
di
tio
na
l o
n 
P
ilo
t D
R
G
 S
ta
tu
s 
an
d 
S
ho
rts
ta
y=
1
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
 L
en
gt
h 
of
 S
ta
y
P
ilo
t D
R
G
s
t-v
al
ue
N
on
-P
ilo
t D
R
G
s
t-v
al
ue
D
iff
er
en
ce
 (P
ilo
t-N
on
pi
lo
t)
C
on
st
an
t
4.
28
60
94
47
.8
7.
75
94
66
11
2.
15
-3
.4
73
37
2
A
ge
 
-0
.0
12
28
87
-1
3
-0
.0
43
28
01
-5
5.
24
0.
03
09
91
4
Fe
m
al
e
-0
.2
58
03
29
-1
7.
01
-0
.3
80
21
72
-3
2.
3
0.
12
21
84
3
B
la
ck
 
0.
61
10
80
4
20
.3
6
-0
.3
58
07
09
-1
4.
4
0.
96
91
51
3
H
is
pa
ni
c
0.
46
72
97
1
12
.5
3
-0
.0
57
66
22
-2
.0
1
0.
52
49
59
3
A
si
an
0.
78
59
04
6
10
.6
7
-0
.1
10
07
66
-2
.2
3
0.
89
59
81
2
N
at
iv
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
0.
33
75
56
4
1.
61
-0
.1
90
81
35
-1
.3
2
0.
52
83
69
9
O
th
er
 R
ac
e
0.
33
61
96
6
5.
06
0.
23
95
05
1
4.
76
0.
09
66
91
5
S
m
al
l H
os
pi
ta
l
-0
.1
53
26
05
-6
.4
8
-0
.2
00
10
1
-1
0.
36
0.
04
68
40
5
La
rg
e 
H
os
pi
ta
l
0.
14
24
89
7
8.
52
0.
19
70
73
1
14
.5
-0
.0
54
58
34
R
ur
al
 
-0
.2
11
93
27
-8
.0
6
-0
.4
38
87
43
-2
1.
63
0.
22
69
41
6
U
rb
an
 T
ea
ch
in
g
0.
31
24
02
9
11
.8
2
0.
22
03
86
2
10
.2
2
0.
09
20
16
7
M
id
w
es
t
-0
.0
71
35
92
-2
.7
2
-0
.0
36
08
02
-1
.6
9
-0
.0
35
27
9
S
ou
th
-0
.0
20
51
79
-0
.7
1
0.
00
02
94
5
0.
01
-0
.0
20
81
24
W
es
t
-0
.1
84
90
3
-6
.0
7
-0
.3
49
63
12
-1
4.
38
0.
16
47
28
2
G
ov
't 
P
riv
at
e
-0
.0
96
57
64
-2
.7
-0
.0
14
72
17
-0
.5
1
-0
.0
81
85
47
G
ov
't 
N
on
fe
de
ra
l
-0
.2
10
61
22
-6
.5
3
0.
12
90
49
5
4.
88
-0
.3
39
66
17
P
riv
at
e 
P
ro
fit
-0
.1
23
02
82
-5
.0
8
0.
16
27
40
2
8.
16
-0
.2
85
76
84
P
riv
at
e 
O
th
er
-0
.0
03
43
71
-0
.0
7
0.
17
59
82
1
4.
78
-0
.1
79
41
92
P
os
tB
B
A
-0
.0
64
53
77
-1
.5
4
-0
.2
24
93
24
-1
0.
13
0.
16
03
94
7
Tr
an
sf
er
0.
86
71
49
6
19
.7
1
0.
50
20
11
3
16
.9
2
0.
36
51
38
3
P
os
tB
B
A
Tr
an
sf
er
0.
03
88
29
1
0.
82
-0
.0
13
05
25
-0
.4
1
0.
05
18
81
6
N
=2
01
52
1
N
=1
44
42
5
F=
21
9.
72
F=
39
0.
83
R
2  =
 .0
22
4
R
2
=.
05
38
120
Ta
bl
e 
3.
23
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
R
es
ul
ts
, I
nt
er
ac
te
d 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
 L
en
gt
h 
of
 S
ta
y
C
on
st
an
t: 
13
.3
40
66
N
on
-in
te
ra
ct
ed
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
In
te
ra
ct
ed
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
S
E
t-v
al
ue
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
S
E
t-v
al
ue
F-
va
lu
e 
A
ge
 
-0
.0
67
78
53
0.
00
18
85
4
-3
5.
95
0.
07
01
85
2
0.
00
25
27
3
27
.7
7
77
1.
22
Fe
m
al
e
-0
.4
95
75
79
0.
02
87
36
3
-1
7.
25
-0
.3
53
28
93
0.
03
94
87
7
-8
.9
5
80
.0
5
B
la
ck
 
1.
18
54
18
0.
05
49
26
3
21
.5
8
0.
78
27
47
2
0.
07
49
88
10
.4
4
10
8.
96
H
is
pa
ni
c
0.
82
23
09
1
0.
06
78
50
4
12
.1
2
0.
45
39
74
4
0.
09
37
00
6
4.
84
23
.4
7
A
si
an
1.
60
96
32
0.
11
76
61
8
13
.6
8
0.
79
73
01
2
0.
16
90
23
4
4.
72
22
.2
5
N
at
iv
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
0.
96
05
59
1
0.
36
19
20
2
2.
65
0.
17
41
22
9
0.
51
54
37
6
0.
34
0.
11
O
th
er
 R
ac
e
0.
34
27
39
9
0.
12
01
1
2.
85
0.
63
52
93
9
0.
16
34
31
6
3.
89
15
.1
1
S
m
al
l H
os
pi
ta
l
-0
.4
88
56
73
0.
04
80
93
-1
0.
16
0.
09
89
40
9
0.
06
43
51
7
1.
54
2.
36
La
rg
e 
H
os
pi
ta
l
0.
72
74
33
3
0.
03
30
89
4
21
.9
8
-0
.1
63
04
31
0.
04
44
98
6
-3
.6
6
13
.4
2
R
ur
al
 
-0
.9
94
64
87
0.
04
98
64
8
-1
9.
95
0.
60
78
12
6
0.
06
77
76
7
8.
97
80
.4
2
U
rb
an
 T
ea
ch
in
g
0.
61
17
69
8
0.
05
03
26
12
.1
6
0.
42
35
00
3
0.
06
76
16
6
6.
26
39
.2
3
M
id
w
es
t
-1
.3
42
44
9
0.
05
04
09
8
-2
6.
63
-0
.5
76
90
42
0.
06
76
22
8
-8
.5
3
72
.7
8
S
ou
th
-0
.8
74
16
36
0.
05
29
93
8
-1
6.
5
-1
.0
49
01
8
0.
07
21
56
-1
4.
54
21
1.
36
W
es
t
-1
.4
01
11
8
0.
05
81
64
-2
4.
09
-0
.5
54
49
1
0.
07
86
72
5
-7
.0
5
49
.6
8
G
ov
't 
P
riv
at
e
-0
.0
35
05
27
0.
06
45
84
6
-0
.5
4
-0
.0
87
15
48
0.
08
68
27
7
-1
1.
01
G
ov
't 
N
on
fe
de
ra
l
-0
.1
33
64
95
0.
06
03
48
6
-2
.2
1
0.
01
82
81
9
0.
08
07
09
2
0.
23
0.
05
P
riv
at
e 
P
ro
fit
-0
.2
43
22
64
0.
04
87
32
3
-4
.9
9
0.
41
57
71
8
0.
06
56
64
6
6.
33
40
.0
9
P
riv
at
e 
O
th
er
-0
.2
49
81
11
0.
08
85
31
4
-2
.8
2
0.
03
19
38
2
0.
11
81
99
4
0.
27
0.
07
P
os
tB
B
A
-0
.0
33
98
97
0.
06
27
77
5
-0
.5
4
0.
10
17
99
1
0.
10
25
57
5
0.
99
0.
99
Tr
an
sf
er
2.
77
05
16
0.
07
65
25
1
36
.2
-0
.0
76
71
22
0.
12
22
62
9
-0
.6
3
14
5.
26
P
os
tB
B
A
Tr
an
sf
er
0.
36
28
56
7
0.
08
20
66
6
4.
42
-1
.3
72
05
9
0.
11
38
40
1
-1
2.
05
0.
39
P
ilo
tD
R
G
-5
.7
73
71
3
0.
23
44
68
1
-2
4.
62
N
ot
e:
 In
te
ra
ct
ed
 v
ar
ia
bl
e=
pi
lo
td
rg
*v
ar
ia
bl
e 
i
N
=7
29
51
9
F=
80
6.
70
R
2 =
0.
04
54
121
Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
 
Obesity and Wages 
 
The research contained in this dissertation touched on different topics 
within the field of health economics.  The first paper, “An Economic Analysis of 
Obesity on Wages,” examined the effects of overweight and obesity on wage 
income, improving on previous research by using a dataset—the 2000 Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey—with more detailed health conditions and industry 
and occupation variables.  In the dataset used in this essay, 35% of the 
observations in this dataset are overweight and 16% of the observations 
represent obese persons.  In total, 51% of the observations in this dataset are 
over what is recognized as a healthy weight.   
As discussed in the essay, the results are noteworthy because they 
appear to contradict previous research on this topic.  Three sets of regressions 
were run.  In the first set, wages for the year 2000 were regressed on 
demographic variables, health, industry and occupation variables, and dummy 
variables based on BMI.  These results were interesting, because it appears that, 
relative to women who are within a normal weight range, overweight women 
experience only a very slight—and statistically insignificant—wage penalty of 
1.8%, and obese women experience a higher wage penalty of just under 4%, but 
this is again not statistically significant.      
Interacting the overweight and obese dummy variables with each industry 
and occupational variable, as done in the other two sets of regressions, yields 
the most interesting results.  While being overweight hurts men in certain 
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occupation categories, being overweight does not significantly hurt women.  
Furthermore, being obese hurts both men and women.  For men, only those 
working in entertainment are significantly hurt, as obese men had wages 44% 
less (after adjustment) relative to non-obese men.  The entertainment and sales 
industries were not kind to the wages of obese women, with obese women 
earning 15% less in the sales industry and 34% less, after adjustment, in the 
entertainment industry relative to non-obese women. 
Policy Implications for Obesity  
 
Perhaps one of the most important questions for economists to ponder is, 
is there a role for government with regards to obesity?  As mentioned at the 
outset, excess body weights is associated with chronic illness and, if overweight 
individuals consume more health care, financial externalities exist, particularly if 
the health care is publicly financed.   
Economists and any professional with an interest in public health must 
continue to ask important questions about obesity.  With regards to the labor 
market, the obvious question is: Why would overweight and obesity impact 
wages?  Overweight individuals (those with BMI from 24-29) and obese 
individuals (those with BMI of at least 30) could face discrimination in the labor 
market.  If excess weight contributes to ill health, then those workers could be 
less productive than less heavy (and less sick) workers.  Last, if individuals have 
excess weight because of a lack of motivation to exercise, then it is possible for 
those individuals to sort themselves into certain jobs.   
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So, what is the role for government to play?  In order to answer that 
question, it is important to realize the complexity of this issue.  Obesity is not just 
an issue of overeating, but it also encompasses education issues, agricultural 
and food manufacturing and marketing issues, and urban planning.   
Governmental policies and programs affect many of the environmental 
determinants of poor diets and sedentary lifestyles.  For example, USDA’s Food 
and Nutrition Service (FNS) funds and oversees federal food assistance 
programs, such as the Food Stamp Program, the National School Lunch and 
Breakfast Programs, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for 
Women, Infants, and Children (www.fns.usda.gov).  
Communities, workplaces, schools, medical centers, and many other 
venues are subject to federal and other governmental regulations that could be 
modified to make the environment more conducive to healthful diet and activity 
patterns.  Therefore, government can intervene in many ways.  Discussion of 
possible future governmental programs is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
intervention could be in the form of education programs, refinement of food 
labels, and pedestrian friendly urban planning. 
Medicare 
 
The second essay, “An Economic Analysis of the Impact on Health Care 
of Certain Medicare Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,” examined 
the effect of the Post Acute Care Transfer Policy, as laid out in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, on the lengths of stay of certain Medicare patients.  The 
Medicare provisions of the Balanced Budget Act were a result of concern about 
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the financial health of the Medicare program.  Hospital payments for patients 
transferred to post acute care were targeted because of the possibility that 
patients were being transferred “too soon”, with hospitals effectively receiving 
excess payment. 
As outlined in the essay, the dataset used in this analysis is the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), administered by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).  This dataset, covering the years 
1998-2000, contains information on diagnoses, patient demographics and basic 
hospital characteristics.  The final sample used in this study includes only 
patients age 65 and older, listing Medicare as the primary payer, discharged 
alive, that fall under one of the 20 DRGs considered for or included in the policy.   
A variety of regressions were run, from the general to the more specific. 
Regressions included interaction variables to estimate the effects of DRG 
category and discharge date on length of stay.  The initial regressions yielded 
results that were not entirely expected given the intent of the policy. That is, it 
was expected that the interaction variables—PostBBAPilot—would have a 
positive and significant coefficient, reflecting the idea that hospitals would no 
longer have the financial incentive to discharge patients early who were grouped 
into the 10 “pilot” DRGs.  On the other hand, the early results were likely 
reflective of lack of specificity. Regressions addressed the issue of timing, 
transfer status and finally the “short stay” patients, those with lengths of stay that 
are at least 1 day less than the geometric mean length of stay for that DRG in a 
fiscal year (which, for the federal government, begins October 1).  In analyzing 
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these patients, the data show that the lengths of stay for patients that were 
grouped into the pilot DRGs and were transferred after 10/01/98 did not increase.  
This is not consistent with the aim of this policy.   
Policy Implications for Medicare 
 
The continuing rise of health care and Medicare costs and the increased 
longevity of the population mean that the financial health of Medicare needs to be 
strengthened if the program is to continue protecting beneficiaries from the cost 
of health care.   
For example, the baby boom generation, about 76 million people born 
between 1946 and 1964, will contribute significantly to the growth in the number 
of elderly individuals who need medical care the amount of resources required to 
pay for it (General Accountability Office 2003). In 2011, the first of the baby 
boomers, a generation numbering 78.2 million as of 2005, will turn 65 years old, 
becoming eligible for Medicare. The first baby boomers reach age 85 in 2030.  In 
2000, individuals aged 65 or older made up 12.7 percent of our nation’s total 
population. By 2020, that percentage will increase by nearly one third to 16.5 
percent--one in six Americans--and will represent nearly 20 million more seniors 
than there are today. By 2040, the numbers of seniors aged 85 years is expected 
to be 14 million (www.census.gov). 
As Medicare spending increases over time, the program’s premium 
amounts will continue to rise as well.  As mentioned in the essay, between 2003 
and 2007, the monthly Part B premium increased to $93.50 per month 
(www.cms.hhs.gov).  The premium increases have been especially high in recent 
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years, due in part to provider payment increases and the growth of Part B drug 
spending. 
In addition, significant coverage gaps remain: Medicare provides limited 
coverage of certain health care services, including mental health, long-term care, 
vision, hearing, and dental care.  As technology and other health care costs 
continue to rise, it could become increasingly difficult for beneficiaries to afford 
the costs of Medicare’s premiums and cost-sharing, as well as the costs of 
services that Medicare does not cover.  
According to the Government Accountability Office (2003), long-term 
budget simulations continue to show that, in the absence of entitlement or 
significant fiscal reform, demographic trends and rising health care spending will 
drive escalating federal deficits and debt.  Just as physicians take the Hippocratic 
Oath to “do no harm,” policymakers should avoid adopting reforms that will 
worsen Medicare’s long-term financial health. 
Ultimately, broader health care reforms must be considered, as problems 
with growth in spending are not exclusive to Medicare. For both public and 
private payers, containing growth in health expenditures will be a 21st century 
challenge. Potential policies for financially strengthening Medicare include 
reducing provider payments, reducing Medicare benefits, increasing the eligibility 
age, increasing payroll taxes, or increasing beneficiary premiums.  Combinations 
of these tools are also possible. 
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